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more than 80 countries. It exploits the presence of 
confirmed zero investment flows between countries 
to estimate productivity cut-offs of firms that invest 
abroad profitably. This approach corrects likely biases 
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a theoretically derived gravity-type model. The analysis 
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INVESTING ACROSS BORDERS: DO FDI-SPECIFIC
REGULATIONS MATTER?
“Happy families are all alike;
every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.”
– Lev Nikolayevich Tolstoy, Anna Karenina, 1878
1.1 introduction
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) remains one of the most important forms of cross-
border capital ﬂow into developing countries: in 2009, FDI inﬂow amounted to
more than US$510 billion, exceeding inward remittance (US$307 billion) and de-
velopment aid (US$91 billion).1 As shown in Figure 1, however, just nine countries
have accounted for about 60 percent of FDI inﬂow into developing countries over
the past decade.2 In an era when almost all countries in the world welcome FDI, al-
lowing an average foreign equity ownership of 90 percent across all sectors (Table
22), this cross-country asymmetry deserves explanation that is beyond the obvious
such as countries’ sizes and growth prospects.
In this paper, I focus on the policy and institutional determinants of FDI using
a new cross-country data set, Investing Across Borders (IAB) 2010, drawn from
World Bank Group (2010). The data set consists of indicators of FDI regulation that
1 The ﬁgures on FDI, remittances, and development aid are from UNCTAD (2011), World Bank (2010),
and World Bank (2011), respectively.
2 With the onset of the global ﬁnancial crisis in 2007, FDI inﬂow into developed countries fell from a
peak of US$1.31 trillion in 2007 to US$602 billion in 2009, whereas the more modest fall in developing
countries occurred with a lag of one year, from a peak of US$658 billion in 2008 to US$511 billion
in 2009. FDI ﬂow increased rapidly from 1990 onward reaching the ﬁrst peak of US$1.4 trillion in
2000. There was a dip in 2003, which is attributed to the drop in the share prices of high-technology
companies (Helpman 2011). According to UNCTAD (2011), total FDI stock globally stands at a record
US$19.1 trillion as of 2010.
12 investing across borders: do fdi-specific regulations matter?



































































































speciﬁcally measure each country’s i) openness to foreign investment by sector;
ii) quality of institutions related to resolving investment disputes; and iii) time,
procedures and rules required to set up wholly foreign-owned subsidiaries. These
FDI-speciﬁc indicators are the most comprehensive to date in terms of topics and
countries, and they obviate the need to rely on proxy indicators for policy openness
or the quality of institutions.
I also adopt a new methodological approach that corrects for two major biases
prevalent in standard gravity models of FDI.3 The ﬁrst one arises when limiting
the sample to only those countries that actually have an investment relationship
with each other and excluding those that do not. This is a problem of country
selection induced by zero bilateral ﬂows. The second bias arises when ﬁrms are
not differentiated by their ability to meet the ﬁxed costs of investing abroad. This
3 Gravity models predict that bilateral ﬂows such as trade, investment, and migration depend posi-
tively on economic pull such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of both home (exporter) and host
(importer) countries, and negatively on frictions such as distance and policy barriers. For more on
gravity models, see Bergeijk & Brakman (2010).1.1 introduction 3
is the problem of ﬁrm heterogeneity. The two biases are linked when zero ﬂows
are caused by the ﬁxed cost of investing abroad, and only the more productive
ﬁrms meet such costs.
I build on the insight of the new trade literature that ﬁrms are heterogenous
within industries in terms of productivity, size, use of inputs, and wages.4 This
translates into distinct decisions by ﬁrms (that co-exist within a narrowly-deﬁned
industry) on whether or not to export, or undertake FDI, or just serve the do-
mestic market (Greenaway & Kneller 2007; World Trade Organization 2008; Help-
man 2011). When proﬁts are a function of varying productivity and differing ﬁxed
costs, Helpman et al. (2004) show that there is a natural sorting of ﬁrms, with the
most productive self-selecting to undertake FDI. The next tier serves the foreign
market through export, and the least productive serve the domestic market only
(Appendix B).5
The earlier generation of “new” trade models that integrated economies of
scale and monopolistic competition was a breakthrough in understanding a new
source of comparative advantage (Helpman 2011). However, they addressed nei-
ther heterogeneity nor country selection. In particular, the assumption of symme-
try in ﬁrm size and productivity leading to a prediction that all ﬁrms export to all
countries is not supported by evidence at the ﬁrm level.6
4 The seminal paper of this new literature is Melitz (2003). He explains why only a fraction of ﬁrms
export and why exporters are larger and more productive than non-exporters. Note, though, in the
Melitz model, all ﬁrms pay the same wage. This model has generated a vast empirical literature on
ﬁrm-level approach to international trade. It has also been applied to study the quantitative effects
of simulated trade policy reforms (for a recent work, see Balistrery, Hillberry and Rutherford, 2011).
5 This is supported by data. Helpman et al. (2004) show for US manufacturing ﬁrms across 52 sectors
and 38 countries that multinational enterprises had 15 percent more labor productivity than ex-
porters in 1994; exporters were 39 percent more productive than non-exporters. Girma et al. (2004),
Girma & Pisu (2005), and Arnold & Hussinger (2005) all ﬁnd signiﬁcant productivity differences
between ﬁrms that invest abroad and those that do not. Chen & Moore (2010) ﬁnd in the case of
French multinational ﬁrms that those with low productivity are less likely to invest in host countries
with a small market size, high production costs, or low trade costs.
6 The new trade models of the 1980s successfully explained the phenomenon of intra-industry trade as
caused by product differentiation on the part of ﬁrms operating under economies of scale. However,
ﬁrms were assumed to be symmetric. All of them traded, but only the volume depended on trade
costs. In other words, trade costs affected only the intensive margin (the volume of export per ﬁrm),
not the decision of whether to export in the ﬁrst place.4 investing across borders: do fdi-specific regulations matter?
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the relevant literature on
the determinants of FDI, highlighting the institutional drivers on which the pa-
per builds. Section 3 sketches the theoretical derivation of a gravity-like model
for FDI and its empirical extension. Section 4 introduces the data. Section 5 ex-
plains the econometric method used to incorporate ﬁrm heterogeneity and redress
country selection bias. Section 6 shows the main results by comparing benchmark
estimates with those obtained after correcting for biases. Section 7 uses alternative
dependent and explanatory variables to check for robustness of results. The ﬁnal
section concludes.
1.2 related literature
Three sets of literature address why and where ﬁrms choose to serve foreign mar-
kets by setting up foreign subsidiaries, and not through export or licensing ar-
rangements. The ﬁrst (and early) batch of literature emphasized that ﬁrms with
ownership advantages have an incentive to become multi-national as they seek
to internalize their proprietary assets (technology, brand, distributional efﬁciency)
while exploiting location-speciﬁc advantages such as market size or access to fac-
tors of production. This is the Ownership-Location-Internalization (OLI) paradigm
(Dunning 1977). OLI is seen as a “big-tent” paradigm as it has evolved since 1973
(when it was ﬁrst introduced) to cover new ideas and practices in international
business, including joint-ventures (alliance capitalism) and the internet.
Helpman (2011), however, views the OLI paradigm as too broad for the con-
struction of a theory with sharp predictions. He highlights a more focused study
of Internalization through three different lenses: the ﬁrst is the transaction cost
economics of ﬁrm boundaries; the second is the managerial incentives analysis of
internalization; and the third is the property rights approach that builds on the the-
ory of incomplete contracts. Firm-speciﬁc intangible assets are subject to market
failures (such as information asymmetry) and because full rents cannot be appro-1.2 related literature 5
priated on assets through arrangements with third parties, ﬁrms internalize the
market transaction by establishing their own subsidiaries.7
The second set of literature attempts to account for the long-term determi-
nants of FDI in a general equilibrium framework. Helpman (1984) proposed the
vertical model of FDI where a ﬁrm fragments production of differentiated ﬁnal
goods at locations that are abundant in factors used intensively in a speciﬁc phase
of production. The headquarters specialize in research and development, and pro-
duction occurs at locations with competitive factor costs. This model predicts that
FDI occurs between countries that are differently endowed.
Markusen (1984) proposed a horizontal model where ﬁrm-level scale economies
drive FDI, which explains a large share of FDI across countries with similar factor
endowments. Firms produce the same product at multiple locations with the aim
of serving local markets directly rather than through exports. Brainard (1997) ﬁnds
that such FDI, relative to exports, is increasing with higher trade costs, decreasing
with investment barriers, and decreasing with scale economies at the plant level.8
Although the typology of FDI as either horizontal (market-seeking) or vertical
(efﬁciency-seeking) is neat, most multinational ﬁrms today combine vertical and
horizontal models of FDI. Markusen (1997) calls this a knowledge-capital model,
in which activities are split across geography based on differing skill intensities.
At the same time there are multiple production units of the same good taking ad-
vantage of non-rivalrous intra-ﬁrm assets.9 Yeaple (2003) presents a model of why
7 Within subsidiaries, Lerner & Schoar (2005) ﬁnd that investors in countries with weaker legal provi-
sions for complex contract enforcement are more likely to insist on majority ownership and control
of the board, even if such investments have lower valuation and returns. They contrast common and
civil legal regimes in the degree to which complex contracts on cash ﬂow and control can be assigned
to different parties. Common law allows complex contract contingencies that allow investors to shift
control rights depending on performance. Under civil law, control often has to be exercised through
majority ownership. Lerner and Shoar (2005) show that this leads investors to opt for convertible
preferred stock in common law countries, and common stock or debt in civil law countries.
8 In Brainard (1997), all ﬁrms make the same choices of either exporting or undertaking FDI. Contrary
to the framework of Helpman et al. (2004) exports and FDI do not co-exist in the same industry.
9 The vertical model suggests that trade and FDI are complements; the horizontal model suggests
they are substitutes; and, loosely, the knowledge-capital model suggests that trade and FDI tend
to be substitutes for similar countries and complements for those with different factor proportion.6 investing across borders: do fdi-specific regulations matter?
ﬁrms may choose “complex integration” of both horizontal and vertical motiva-
tions for FDI.
The third set of literature takes a partial equilibrium approach by looking at
exogenous and policy factors that affect the magnitude of FDI, not whether FDI
takes place in the ﬁrst place or not. It explores the role of exchange rates, trade
protection, taxes, agglomeration, and the quality of institutions, among others, as
driving the magnitude of FDI (Blonigen 2005).
The empirical part of this paper, which is in the partial equilibrium tradition,
focuses on the institutional determinants of FDI. I am mainly concerned with poor
economic institutions that constrain human behavior by distorting incentives. This
includes weak rule of law, limits on private ownership, expropriation risks, lack of
enforcement of contracts, poor provision of public goods, over-regulation, and high
costs of doing business whose cumulative effect is to deter entrepreneurship. Poor
institutions also contribute to an indifferent quality of public goods that discourage
investment, domestic or foreign. The challenge in this literature has been to ﬁnd
appropriate measures of the quality of institutions.10
One of the ﬁrst papers to explore the effects of policy and institutional quality
on FDI is Wheeler & Mody (1992). They consider a list of 13 variables to represent
institutional quality (“risk”), and nine variables to represent openness, and show
both risk and openness to be insigniﬁcant determinants of FDI. Wei (2000) and Wei
& Shleifer (2000) ﬁnd that corruption and tax rates on multinational ﬁrms affect
inward FDI negatively. While ﬁrms may voluntarily choose not to invest in highly
corrupt countries, all else being equal, Hines (1995) ﬁnds that legislation at source
can be a deterrent: the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 in the
United States led to a decline in American investment in bribe-prone countries.
In the international business literature, Dunning (1993) summarized four motives for FDI: market
seeking, natural resource seeking, efﬁciency seeking, and strategic asset seeking.
10 In the economics literature, the primary focus is on market-creating institutions such as the protec-
tion of private property and the rule of law (Rodrik et al. 2002). The Economist argues that there is no
consensus on what the rule of law constitutes (The Economist 2008).1.2 related literature 7
Stein & Daude (2002) and Daude & Stein (2007) use a broad set of “institu-
tional” variables to ﬁnd that regulatory burden is an important determinant of
FDI location. They draw on a wide range of sources: i) World Governance Indi-
cators (WGI) developed by Kaufmann et al. (2010); (ii) International Country Risk
Guide (ICRG) variables on the risk of repudiation of contract, risk of expropriation,
corruption, rule of law, and bureaucratic quality; (iii) La Porta et al. (1999)’s index
of shareholder rights, and (iv) World Business Environment Surveys on taxes and
regulations, policy instability, and corruption.
Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2007) use 2001 survey data from the French Finance Min-
istry to ﬁnd that effective bureaucracy and low corruption, among others, attract
FDI. Kinda (2010) brings to bear ﬁrm-level data to ﬁnd that institutional prob-
lems, together with poor infrastructure and ﬁnancing constraints discourage FDI
in a sample of 77 developing countries. Mottaleb & Kalirajan (2010) use panel
data from 68 low-income and lower-middle income developing countries to show
that open countries that rely on trade, have large GDP, high growth rate, and are
business-friendly tend to be more successful in attracting FDI.
Alfaro et al. (2008) explain the “Lucas Paradox” of inadequate capital ﬂows
from rich to poor countries. Despite rates of return being higher in countries where
capital is scarce, they argue that poor countries do not receive investment from
abroad because of institutional weaknesses. But there are exceptions. Fan et al.
(2009) attribute record inﬂow of FDI into China in recent decades, in spite of the
indifferent quality of the country’s institutions, to its stewardship of sustained
economic growth.
While this literature conﬁrms the salience of speciﬁc institutional variables,
it suffers from limitations relating to model mis-speciﬁcation and variable mis-
measurement. The studies mentioned above do not address the problem of sample
selection that arises when the pairing of FDI-sending and receiving countries does
not occur randomly. They do not incorporate ﬁrm heterogeneity in a cross-national8 investing across borders: do fdi-specific regulations matter?
framework. And they associate FDI inﬂow with general quality of institutions, not
quality that is speciﬁc to FDI.11
Bergstrand and Egger (2009) summarize the vast literature on the theoretical
and empirical foundations of gravity models of trade and FDI. I am, however, not
aware of any paper that addresses the three problems mentioned above in a study
of the institutional determinants of bilateral FDI. As already mentioned, I use new
data on regulations that are speciﬁc to FDI and the new empirical methodology
that has been applied to export ﬂows by Helpman et al. (2008).
Central to the paper’s methodology is the exploitation of the presence of zero
ﬂows between trading partners to estimate productivity cut-offs of ﬁrms that ex-
port abroad proﬁtably. In trade, zero ﬂows inferred from databases like the United
Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE) are ﬂawed because un-
reported ﬁgures are conﬂated with conﬁrmed zeros. Baranga (2009) estimates that
roughly 20 percent of the sample used by Helpman et al. (2008) has been mis-
classiﬁed. In contrast, the database – OECD (2011) – that I use for FDI clearly
distinguishes between missing and zero ﬂows between investment partners. This
greatly enhances the appropriateness of the use of the new methodology in this
paper.
1.3 model
The model is adapted from the gravity-type trade model of Helpman et al. (2008)
and Anderson & Van Wincoop (2003). The derivation of the model – for FDI – is
detailed in Appendix A. A representative consumer prefers variety (v) and maxi-
mizes a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) utility function U = [
R
x(v)dv]1=
subject to aggregate expenditure (E). All varieties have a constant demand elas-
ticity,  = 1
1- > 1. A ﬁrm in country i produces one unit of output with a
11 One exception is Wei & Shleifer (2000), but they acknowledge their coding of incentives and restric-
tions on FDI to be coarse and limited to less than 50 countries.1.3 model 9






































cost-minimizing combination of inputs (cia) where a indexes ﬁrm-speciﬁc pro-
ductivity and measures the number of bundles of the country’s inputs used per
unit of output; ci is the cost of the bundle which is uniform across country i. Firms
maximize proﬁt, and do not interact strategically with each other.
Multinational ﬁrms from home country i sell goods through subsidiaries and
face price and demand in host country j. Serving the foreign market through FDI
(instead of exports) reduces transport costs, but adds non-trivial coordination and
transaction costs represented by f
ij, in addition to the ﬁxed cost (ff
ij) of setting up
a new plant which is assumed to exceed the ﬁxed cost of exporting (fe
ij). (Serving
country j through exports instead would involve exogenous trade and transport
costs, e





There is a wedge between the price of each variety in country j and country
i represented by bilateral mark-up and transaction costs, so pj =
f
ijcja
 . Firm pro-
ductivity is assumed to be Pareto distributed with support [aL, aH] and only ﬁrms10 investing across borders: do fdi-specific regulations matter?
with productivity aij such that aL < aij < aH undertake FDI without incurring a
loss. The proﬁt condition (revenue over demand elasticity net of ﬁxed costs) yields

















k where k is the shape parameter such that k >  - 1. The
distribution of ﬁrm productivity G(a) is common across countries ex ante, but ex
post G(aij) is the distribution of a in country i conditional on the ﬁrm investing
in country j.
Total FDI12 from i to j is
Raij
aL pjxjNidG(a) where G(aij) is multiplied by the
number of ﬁrms Ni which proxies for country i’s economic size. Investment can
increase on either the extensive or the intensive margin. If demand or policy costs
in country j are constant, the only way investment can increase is through an
exogenous productivity shock in country i allowing an increased fraction of ﬁrms
to invest abroad (Fij). If, on the other hand, productivity is constant, investment
can increase only with an increase in the GDP (Yj) or a fall in the ﬁxed and variable
costs in host country j.








12 Technically in this model, FDI should be measured by sales of foreign-owned subsidiaries, but be-
cause of the lack of detailed data, it is proxied by FDI stock. Afﬁliate sales and FDI stock are highly
correlated. The correlation between total assets (that is, FDI stock plus liabilities) and sales of US
majority-owned foreign subsidiaries across 113 countries in 2008 was 0.83. The correlation coefﬁ-
cient of the values of assets and sales, expressed in natural logarithm, is 0.97 (see Figure 2).1.3 model 11














The ﬁrst component is common across all countries, but the second term in brack-
ets reﬂects the country-speciﬁc fraction of ﬁrms that invests abroad.
Equation 1.2 can now be estimated empirically in its log-linear form in equa-
tion 1.4. The main host country (j) variables are as follows: GDP (lnYj), aggregated
CES Price Index (lnPj), and factor costs relevant for FDI (lncj). Factor costs cap-
ture per unit cost of production in country j such as wages, and all policy-related
costs.
fdiij = (-1)ln+(-1)lnPj +(1-)lncj +(1-)lnij (1.4)
+ lnNi +lnYj +vij
The purpose of this paper is to examine how country-speciﬁc FDI-relevant
policies and institutions affect the attraction of FDI in a single cross-section, so host
countries are not assigned dummies. I approximate cj by quantiﬁed FDI-speciﬁc
regulations, GDP per capita, tariffs, and education levels. Variables with subscript
i are captured by a ﬁxed effect for the FDI source country.
Bilateral variables speciﬁc to country pairs such as distance, colonial tie, con-
tiguity, and shared ethnic language can either hinder or facilitate bilateral transac-
tions. Such costs have an observed component dij and an unobserved component
eij.13 An important additional regressor is wij. It captures the ij component of
Fij, the index for extensive margin. It is a monotonic function of the productiv-
ity cut-off, aij, and is correlated with dij because many of the same variables
13 Bilateral transaction costs 1-
ij are parametrized as D

ije-uij; uij  N(0, 2
u)12 investing across borders: do fdi-specific regulations matter?
that determine FDI ﬂow determine the extensive margin. Although wij is unob-
served, the cut-off condition in equation 1.1 implies that it can be estimated by
the conditional probability of a positive investment ﬂow from a probit (ﬁrst-stage)
estimation. Omission of wij would create a heterogeneity bias.
The second bias arises because of the correlation between eij and the included
regressors in equation 1.4 as country pairs with zero investment ﬂows are excluded
from the sample. Only after controlling for these heterogeneity and sample selec-
tion biases can coefﬁcients be rendered more accurate.
The discussion so far permits the speciﬁcation of the benchmark regression
(without correcting for biases) in equation 1.5. The dependent variable is the posi-
tive stock of bilateral FDI from country i to country j, averaged between 2007 and
2008.14 Vector X consists of distance, and dummies for whether two countries share
a border, an ethnic language, or have had a colonial relationship.
The benchmark regression also includes a dummy for whether the two coun-
tries have signed a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) to assure reciprocal protection
of foreign investment in each other’s territory.15 This variable later serves as a valid
14 UNCTAD deﬁnes FDI stock as the value of the share of capital and reserves (including retained
proﬁts) attributable to the parent enterprise (total assets minus total liabilities), plus the net indebt-
edness of the associate or subsidiary to the parent ﬁrm. FDI ﬂows plummeted in 2008-09 because of
the global ﬁnancial crisis. I therefore disregard FDI values after 2008.
15 Most BITs contain broad commitments to protect investments by investors of one state (“the in-
vestor”) in the territory of the other state (“the host state”), ranging from assurances of fair, equi-
table and non-discriminatory treatment to undertakings to observe investment contracts and other
investment-related obligations. As Malik (2006) explains, these protections are accompanied by a
powerful international arbitration mechanism that allows investors to bring claims directly against
the host state alleging violations of these protections under international law. The ability of investors
to enforce their rights directly against a state without the need of an agreement between the investor
and state or the involvement of their own state is seen as one of the most far reaching innovations of
BITs.1.3 model 13
exclusion restriction in a two-step Heckman procedure to control for selection bias.
The estimation equation is:
log(FDIij) = Xija+b1log(Openness)j +b2log(Arbitration)j +b3log(Procedures)j
+ b4(QualityofInstitutions)j +b5log(GDP)j +b6log(GDPpercapita)j




(SourceDummy)i Di +eij (1.5)
The main explanatory variables in host country j are its openness to FDI,
its start-up procedures for FDI, and its FDI-related arbitration regime. A simple
theory on how they restrain FDI is illustrated in Figure 3. In Panel A, hurdles to
start-up a subsidiary or resolve disputes act as cost-escalating measures that reduce
the supply of the good or service (from QtoQ0) as they raise the real resource cost
to providers at every price level. If the supply of foreign providers is choked off at
Q0 (like a quota) there is a rent-creating effect in favor of incumbent ﬁrms.16
Panel B of Figure 3 shows another effect of restricting foreign capital from
Holmes & Hardin (2000). If there is no restriction at the world rental rate (RW)
foreign capital meets the demand between Q0 and Q freely. With maximum own-
ership restriction of, say, 33 percent, every unit of foreign capital is matched by two
units of domestic capital which needs a higher rate of return to be diverted into
the sector. This leads to a derived demand (D0) for domestic capital. The effect
is that the rate of return is higher and less capital is used overall than in a state
where there is no restriction on ownership of equity. The “tariff-equivalent” of the
investment barrier is the difference between the return in the restricted sector and
the return in the world market (R0 -RW).
16 Dee (2003) explains this in terms of liberalization leading to a “triangle gain” from allocative ef-
ﬁciency as the tax-equivalence posed by restrictions to entry are removed, and a “rectangle gain”
from productivity enhancement when the high cost of starting or running a business is reduced in a
manner that saves real resources to be used elsewhere.14 investing across borders: do fdi-specific regulations matter?























I posit that the three indicators of openness, procedures and arbitration cap-
ture a deﬁning thought process of a typical foreign investor. First, the investor is
concerned about whether the host country permits foreigners to set up a business
in a speciﬁc sector; if it does, how much equity can foreigners own? Second, if en-
try is permitted, what additional hurdles (legal and bureaucratic) does the country
pose through regulations and how costly are they? Third, after the operation com-
mences, and if commercial disputes arise, can they be resolved with enforceable
outcomes in a reliable manner? The ﬁrst issue is about FDI-speciﬁc openness; the
second and third issues represent the quality of FDI-speciﬁc institutions.
FDI Openness is measured by computing the average of the percentage of
equity that foreign investors can own in ﬁrms across 11 sectors (more in the next1.3 model 15
section). FDI Procedures measure the number of legal steps required before and
after incorporation to start a wholly foreign-owned business. I construct the FDI
Arbitration index by averaging indicators measuring i) the Ease of Arbitration Pro-
cess and ii) the Extent of Judicial Assistance in resolving commercial disputes from
the IAB data set. The Ease of Arbitration Process assesses whether there are restric-
tions on what the conﬂicting parties can or cannot do to resolve their dispute. The
Extent of Judicial Assistance measures the role of domestic courts in assisting the
process of arbitration and enforcing awards.
To control for the general quality of institutions, I compute a composite indi-
cator of ﬁve WGI developed by Kaufmann et al. (2010) with weights derived from
Principal Components Analysis (PCA). The WGI variables are: i) the rule of law; ii)
control of corruption; iii) regulatory quality; iv) political stability; and v) govern-
mental effectiveness. Of the six WGI indicators, the one that I exclude is “voice
and accountability” which is argued to capture citizens’ participation in selecting
their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and
free media. I ﬁnd this to be a less relevant determinant of FDI.17
The control for a general quality of institutions as measured by the WGI vari-
ables is important because I want to see whether FDI-speciﬁc regulations matter
for FDI over and beyond the general quality of institutions. In other words, after
controlling for the general quality of institutions, do FDI-speciﬁc provisions add
any value?
Market size of the host country, proxied by GDP, is one of the most important
determinants of horizontal FDI. Motives for vertical FDI are captured by GDP per
capita (which proxies for average wage and the quality of infrastructure). Tariff
17 I concur with Thomas (2006) who argues that the concept of voice ﬁrst articulated by Hirschman
(1970) is not synonymous with accountability, freedom to select government, or other political free-
doms. Nor is there a well-documented relationship between them. Overall, in terms of coverage of
countries and topics, the WGI indicators are perhaps the most authoritative and widely used to
assess the quality of institutions across countries over time. They are imperfect because they are
a quantitative aggregation of perceptions (subjective data). For a summary of criticisms of these
indicators and the response from the authors, see Kaufmann et al. (2007).16 investing across borders: do fdi-specific regulations matter?
rates are measured by the weighted average of applied tariffs on manufactured
imports. The effect of high tariffs on FDI, a priori, is ambiguous: it may encourage
tariff-jumping horizontal FDI, but discourage vertical FDI that relies on repeated
ﬂows of parts and components across borders. The general skill level in the country
is assessed by the average number of years of schooling undertaken by adults aged
25 and over. Other determinants of FDI that are not included as regressors are
subsumed under the unobserved term, e. The description, source, and summary
statistics of the variables are in Tables 13 and 14.
1.4 data
I average outward FDI position (stock) in US dollars for 2007 and 2008 from 30
OECD countries into 87 OECD and non-OECD countries belonging to the IAB
sample (Table 16). The years 2007 and 2008 represent the latest and most stable
number of observations in the OECD’s FDI database, prior to the plunge in cross-
border ﬂows in 2009 because of the global ﬁnancial crisis. Two-year averages are
used to smooth out annual ﬂuctuations. For robustness, I also use un-averaged
annual data for 2006, 2007, and 2008. Bilateral FDI from each source country, in-
stead of aggregate FDI from all source countries, is used to cast the relationship in
a gravity framework yielding a richer set of observations than would be the case
for a cross-country regression with aggregate FDI. Source countries include only
members of the OECD because of data constraints; however, they have historically
accounted for the majority of global FDI outﬂows.18
The choice of FDI stock as the dependent variable, preferred to FDI ﬂows,
needs elaboration. The model in Melitz (2003) which inspired Helpman et al. (2008)
is inherently cross-section because it assumes steady state productivity levels for
18 FDI outﬂows from non-OECD countries are increasing. For example, in 2003, 12.3 percent of total
FDI inﬂow into the 10 member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was
from China, India and other ASEAN countries; by 2008, the corresponding share had reached 24.8
percent (ASEAN 2010).1.4 data 17
each year, and does not predict how ﬁrm productivity changes year to year. Be-
cause I do not have a variable time dimension in my econometric model, the effects
of explanatory regressors are on an equilibrium level of FDI. This is better reﬂected
by FDI stock because it is far less volatile on an annual basis than FDI ﬂows. Im-
portantly, the extensive margin of FDI measured by whether multinational ﬁrms
from country i operate in country j can only be estimated by FDI stock, not ﬂows.
For the main explanatory variables, I use the new IAB indicators of FDI regu-
lation across 87 economies, prepared by the World Bank Group in 2010. With 21
countries from Sub-Saharan Africa, 20 from Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 14
from Latin America and Caribbean, 10 from East Asia and Paciﬁc, ﬁve from South
Asia, and ﬁve from the Middle East and North Africa, this sample of 87 countries
can be considered random, and a fair representation of the actual world. In 2007-
08, they constituted 87.1 percent of global population and 77.9 percent of global
output (Table 15). The sample includes 15 high-income OECD countries.
As shown in Figure 4, in terms of market size, the mean and standard devi-
ation of the sample of all countries19 in the world and the subsample of 87 IAB
countries are almost identical. However, within the IAB sample the distribution
of the subgroup with zero FDI observations is remarkably different from the sub-
group with non-zero observations. The sample selection bias is, therefore, likely to
be more prominent within the IAB sample.
The 23 IAB indicators measure, among others, openness to FDI through eq-
uity ownership permitted in 11 sectors (11 indicators); time, procedures and reg-
ulations for starting a foreign business (three indicators); arbitrating commercial
disputes (three indicators); and accessing industrial land (6 indicators). The data
are compiled from detailed surveys ﬁlled out by over 2350 local experts from lead-
ing law and accounting ﬁrms, chambers of commerce, and investment promotion
19 Excludes countries with total population of less than one million in 2008.18 investing across borders: do fdi-specific regulations matter?















































agencies. Collected during the period 2006-08, these indicators reﬂect regulations
that prevailed before 2006 in each of the 87 countries.
In terms of the coverage of subjects, sectors, and countries, this data set on FDI
regulations is the most comprehensive to date. It comprises both de jure indicators
measuring laws and regulations on paper, and de facto indicators that measure
the implementation of those laws. To the extent possible, I create sub-indices of
primarily de facto indicators of FDI Arbitration and FDI Procedures to use in the
empirical estimation. On FDI Openness, the indicators are only de jure, and these
tend to do less justice to countries that are open to foreign investment in prac-
tice but have not enshrined it in written law. I expand on the main explanatory
variables below.
1.4.1 Investing Across Sectors
Restriction on equity ownership across sectors is one of the most important in-
dicators of a country’s policy attitude towards foreign investment. The index of
FDI openness is created for 86 countries20 by averaging the equity ownership per-
mitted for foreign companies across 33 subsectors. These measure statutory (not
de facto) restrictions to the ownership of equity by foreigners in new (greenﬁeld)
investment, and investment in existing ﬁrms through mergers and acquisitions.
Sixty-six data points for each country are aggregated ﬁrst into 33 subsectors, and
then into 11 industries (eight of which are services, two are resources/primary,
and one manufacturing). The ﬁnal index shows on a scale of 0 to 100 the overall
openness in a given country to ownership of ﬁrms by foreign investors (0 being
least open).
20 Excluding Papua New Guinea for which equity data could not be conﬁrmed.20 investing across borders: do fdi-specific regulations matter?
1.4.2 Arbitrating Commercial Disputes
Most foreign companies prefer resolving disputes through arbitration over lengthy
litigation in local courts. The indicators assess the strength of legal frameworks for
alternative dispute resolution by combining the Ease of Arbitration Process and
the Extent of Judicial Assistance indices to represent the quality of FDI-speciﬁc
institutions. This index directly deals with how foreign investors prefer to resolve
contractual or commercial disputes. It is also strongly correlated with the rule of
law, government effectiveness, corruption, and regulatory quality pillars of the
World Governance Indicators that summarize a country’s institutional regime in
general (Figure 5).21
Speciﬁcally, the index on the Ease of Arbitration Process scores, among oth-
ers, best practice provisions for party autonomy and tribunal integrity. Autonomy
assesses whether the laws allow parties to choose arbitrators or arbitral institu-
tions, the language of proceedings, and whether foreign counsels can represent
investors. Tribunal integrity measures whether there exist provisions to ensure
that arbitrators remain independent and impartial and whether the proceedings
remain conﬁdential. The other index on judicial assistance evaluates whether local
courts follow a “pro-arbitration” policy, whether tribunals decide the jurisdiction
of disputes and whether the courts assist tribunals by requiring the appearance of
witnesses and production of evidence.
What are the bases for these indicators? Investors need to be assured that
their investments will not be unjustly expropriated and that in instances of dis-
putes, there is a predictable course for resolution. An effective arbitration regime
for FDI mitigates risk by providing legal security to investors (including assurance
21 The scatter plots in Figure 5 exclude outliers – Afghanistan and the Solomon Islands – that score
zero on the Ease of Arbitration Process index and the Extent of Judicial Assistance index. Serbia is
excluded from the WGI data set. This leaves 84 country observations.1.4 data 21
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of contract enforcement rights, due process, and access to justice). It gives parties
autonomy to create systems tailored to their disputes. According to World Bank
Group (2010), countries that score well on these indicators have a strong arbitration
legal framework, receive support from local courts for arbitration proceedings and
efﬁcient enforcement, adhere to international conventions, and provide autonomy
to parties seeking to resolve their commercial disputes.
1.4.3 Starting a Foreign Business
Starting a Foreign Business indicators record the time, procedures, and regulations
involved in establishing a local subsidiary of a foreign limited liability company.
Here, I use the number of procedures required to establish a foreign business. This
resembles a cost that affects the decision about whether and how much a ﬁrm
invests in a foreign country. The steps include both pre- and post-incorporation
procedures with which foreign businesses are ofﬁcially required to comply. Ac-
cording to World Bank Group (2010), countries that score well on the Starting a
Foreign Business indicators have simple and transparent establishment processes
that abolish unnecessary steps (which create opportunities for rent-seeking). High
scorers also treat foreign and domestic investors equally, and differences in treat-
ment vary only by company size, legal form or commercial activity, not the na-
tionality of shareholders. Tables 19 to 21 describe how indicators of FDI-speciﬁc
regulations are constructed in the IAB data set. I separately construct composite
country scores for the quality of selected FDI regulations in Table 22.22
22 The Investing Across Sectors score (1) averages the maximum percentage of equity permitted for
foreign ownership in the 11 sectors mentioned in Table 19. The Ease of Process Index (2) and the
Ease of Judicial Assistance Index (3) are obtained by normalizing the country score for those indices
using the min-max rule: the score for a country is subtracted from the best-performing country,
divided by the difference in scores between the best and worst-performing countries. The number
is then multiplied by 100. Higher the score, better is the regime in place for resolving commercial
disputes. The score for the Number of Procedures (4) is also obtained by normalizing the country
score using the min-max rule. However, the ﬁnal score is multiplied by, and subtracted from, 100.
Higher the score, the fewer the number of pre- and post-incorporation procedural steps formally
required to establish a wholly foreign-owned subsidiary.1.4 data 23
1.4.4 Bilateral Investment Treaty
Data on bilateral investment treaties between 30 OECD source countries and 87
IAB host countries are collected from UNCTAD’s Investment Instruments On-
line.23 Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) are agreements between countries for
the reciprocal encouragement, promotion and protection of investments in their
territories. Like preferential trade agreements, BITs, too, have proliferated dramat-
ically in recent decades from around 400 in 1990 to over 2,500 at present.
1.4.5 Gravity and Other Variables
The gravity variables – distance, past colonial relationship, contiguity and shared
languages – are obtained from CEPII (2010). Economic variables – GDP, GDP per
capita, average (weighted) applied tariff on manufactured imports – are from the
World Development Indicators (WDI) database (World Bank 2011). Mean years of
schooling are from Barro & Lee (2010), as intrapolated in UNDP (2010). These
explanatory variables available annually are averaged over the preceding ﬁve years,
that is, 2002 to 2006 to minimize the possibility of simultaneity. I compute the
remoteness index as the sum of all bilateral distances between a country and all its
partners, weighted by the share of the partner’s GDP in total world output.
With 30 source countries and 87 host countries, there are 2610 potential ob-
servations. Gravity-related information is not available for three host countries
(Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia). Because 15 OECD countries also appear in the
IAB sample of FDI recipients, another 15 observations are lost, reducing the num-
ber of observations to 2505. If FDI stock data are missing for the years 2007-08, but
they were reported for the period 2002-06, I recode the missing data points as zero.
23 See UNCTAD (2010).24 investing across borders: do fdi-specific regulations matter?
This affects 82 country pairs; 641 data points are deemed missing and dropped
along with 29 negative values for FDI stock (divestitures).
Of the remaining 1835 observations, there are 724 observations that are con-
ﬁrmed to be zeros.24 Not all of the 87 countries in the IAB sample have values for
all explanatory variables. Papua New Guinea has no data on FDI Openness; Sierra
Leone, Haiti and Liberia do not have data on tariffs. Further, four OECD source
countries (Italy, Spain, Japan and Switzerland) do not have zero FDI in any of the
remaining IAB countries (after missing values are dropped). This poses a problem
for the two-step econometric methodology employed in this paper; those source
countries are therefore dropped. Belgium and Mexico do not report any data for
FDI stock for the years under consideration. All these reduce the number of obser-
vations used in the estimation of the main regressions to 1578 bilateral FDI stock
values between 24 OECD source countries and 80 IAB host countries, including
666 observations of conﬁrmed bilateral ﬂows with the value of zero.
1.5 estimation method
The estimation method proceeds in ﬁve stages. First, I estimate the log-linearized
gravity equation 1.5 using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method, without cor-
recting for biases. Second, I correct for the selection bias in two steps. First, a probit
model predicts the probability, ˆ pij, of countries having a positive FDI relationship
conditional on explanatory variables that are used to estimate equation 1.5. I use
the binary BIT variable as a valid exclusion restriction. This permits the computa-
tion of the inverse Mills ratio (b ij) for inclusion as an additional regressor in the
second step to control for sample selection.
In Figure 6, the top-left graph shows predicted probability of OECD countries
i investing in country j on the y-axis. The x-axis plots the normalized ﬁtted values
24 As already explained, one positive aspect of OECD’s bilateral FDI statistics is that they clearly distin-
guish between values that are missing and values that are conﬁrmed to be zeros. In trade statistics,
this is often not done, leading researchers to erroneously treat unreported (missing) data as zero.1.5 estimation method 25























































































































of the latent variable that affects FDI participation. The top right graph plots the
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the unit normal (predicted probability)
on the y-axis against the PDF of the ﬁtted value of the latent variable on the x-axis.
The ratio (PDF/CDF) obtained is the inverse Mills ratio (b ), as depicted on the x-
axis of the bottom-left graph. The inverse Mills ratio controls for the fact that there
are countries in the sample with low predicted probability (and large errors).
Selection bias occurs in two ways: i) when only countries with “high” values
of observed variables are included in a non-random sample; and ii) when coun-
tries with “low” values of observed explanatory variables are also in the sample
with large, unobserved error terms. It is (ii) that is a more serious problem because
the correlation between the error terms and the observed variables biases the co-
efﬁcients. For example, the Sub-Saharan economy, Mali, in 2007-08 had an FDI
relationship only with France (among OECD members). Conditional on observed
explanatory variables, the predicted probability of a positive FDI relationship be-26 investing across borders: do fdi-specific regulations matter?
tween Mali and France is 0.57. If France had not been a former colonial power, the
predicted probability would have been 0.36. The second scenario would then have
led to a higher inverse Mills ratio.25
Third, I take into account ﬁrm heterogeneity by incorporating controls derived
from predicted probabilities which are ﬁrst normalized, ˆ zij = -1(ˆ pij). Because
the latent variable that determines whether or not two countries have an FDI rela-
tionship is linked to the productivity level of the marginal ﬁrm, it can be used to
control for the unobserved heterogeneity term in equation 1.4. If ﬁrm productivity
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, Helpman et al. (2008) show that control for unobserved
ﬁrm heterogeneity can be estimated by ˆ zij = ˆ zij +b ij. In other words, the index ˆ zij,
shown on the bottom right graph of Figure 6 as Z1, controls for the effect of invest-
ment restrictions on the proportion of ﬁrms able to proﬁtably invest abroad. If the
host (and bilateral) country characteristics pose low barriers (cj, ij,fij) and there
is high demand in (Yj), for a given level of productivity (aij) a greater fraction of
ﬁrms will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to invest.
Fourth, the ﬁnal regression is estimated both by Non-linear Least Squares (NLS)
and OLS. The former is a parametric estimation that requires ﬁrm productivity to
be Pareto-distributed. Helpman et al. (2008) suggest that estimates can also be
obtained from OLS if the extensive margin is represented by a polynomial of ˆ zij.26
Because the OLS coefﬁcients have the same sign and are very close in magnitude
to the NLS estimates, I opt for the simpler OLS method to report most of the
robustness results in subsequent sections.
25 Note that probit also predicts a moderately high probability of two other source countries – United
States (US) and Netherlands – having a direct investment relationship with Mali even though in real-
ity they do not invest there. This is because the two countries have invested in similar-sized African
economies: the Netherlands in Burkina Faso and Rwanda, and the US in Rwanda. The Netherlands
also has a BIT signed with Burkina Faso and the US has one with Rwanda.
26 Note that b  =
(ˆ zij)
(ˆ zij); ˆ zij = -1(ˆ pij); and ˆ zij = ˆ zij +b ij1.6 results 27
Fifth, the two biases that are corrected in the preceding step are disentangled
to assess the relative dominance of each. The purpose is to ﬁnd whether the fail-
ure to control for ﬁrm heterogeneity biases the coefﬁcients more than the failure
to control for sample selection bias arising from zero investment ﬂows between
numerous country pairs.
All the inferences are based on standard errors that are robust and clustered
by host country under the assumption that FDI from OECD countries ﬂowing to
a common host country is inﬂuenced by the latter’s characteristics that apply in
common to all source countries, in addition to pair-speciﬁc characteristics. If a
shock in a host country affects potential investment from all source countries, then
FDI inﬂows are correlated. As Moulton (1990) shows, if errors within groups are
correlated, but incorrectly assumed to be independent, standard errors are likely
to be substantially biased downward leading to ﬁndings of statistical signiﬁcance
that are spurious. In this paper, clustering of standard errors by host country yields
the most conservative set of inferences on the signiﬁcance of coefﬁcients, and is the
chosen approach in all the regressions.27
1.6 results
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 1 report the main results, obtained from NLS and OLS
models, respectively. When both the biases introduced by country selection and
ﬁrm selection are corrected, FDI-speciﬁc institutions signiﬁcantly affect the accu-
mulation of foreign direct investment.
The coefﬁcient of FDI Arbitration – a variable with a close relationship with
a judicial regime and enforcement – is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level, whereas it
was not statistically different from zero in the benchmark estimation that does not
27 I also cluster standard errors by source country (to account for agglomeration tendencies) and by
country pairs. Clustering by source country makes several coefﬁcients appear much more signiﬁcant
than when clustering is by host country. Note that the magnitudes of coefﬁcients do not change
irrespective of how the standard errors are clustered.28 investing across borders: do fdi-specific regulations matter?
correct for biases (column 2). An improvement of ten percent in the standardized
score for FDI Arbitration (say, from 70 to 77) increases the stock of FDI by at least
4 percent.
The coefﬁcient on FDI Procedures is signiﬁcant in the (biased) OLS estimate of
column 2, but its magnitude increases in the bias-corrected estimates of columns 3
and 4. Both FDI Procedures and FDI Arbitration coefﬁcients are highly signiﬁcant
after controlling for the general quality of institutions in the country. The coefﬁ-
cient on institutional quality is not positively signiﬁcant either when it is proxied
by the composite WGI indicator or when it is replaced by each of the ﬁve separate
constituents of WGI in Tables 4 through 8.
Previous studies (for example, Daude & Stein 2007) found a strong associa-
tion between good institutions and high FDI inﬂow. My results suggest that FDI-
speciﬁc provisions in practice offer direct incentives for FDI in a manner over and
above what is offered by good institutions in general. FDI is responsive to speciﬁc
instruments such as an effective arbitration regime and less onerous business start-
up procedures. In the presence of sound FDI-speciﬁc provisions, the generally high
quality of institutions and governance appears to add no additional attraction to
FDI. From a policy maker’s perspective, this is not bad news. A minister keen on
attracting FDI into her country need not be despondent that it would take decades
to overhaul the rule of law or reduce high levels of corruption; she can start with
piecemeal reforms in regulation and enforcement that are of direct concern to in-
vestors.
The coefﬁcient of FDI Openness, however, is not signiﬁcant in any of the re-
gressions. This implies that openness to FDI “on paper” is not meaningful. While
FDI Procedures and FDI Arbitration indices mainly consist of de facto indicators
that assess the implementation of laws and not just the written text, the FDI Open-
ness index comprises solely of de jure indicators. High FDI-receiving countries like
Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC), for example, have lower openness scores1.6 results 29
Table 1: Main Regressions: FDI Stock in 2007-2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probit Benchmark Heterogeneity Bias I Bias II
NLS OLS
FDI Procedures -.060 .458** .514** .501** .515** .457**
(.095) (.197) (.200) (.202) (.199) (.203)
FDI Arbitration -.159** .260 .411** .409** .362* .300
(.064) (.206) (.200) (.197) (.195) (.206)
FDI Openness -.113 .054 .141 .127 .119 .061
(.107) (.128) (.126) (.130) (.124) (.126)
Quality of Institutions .390** -.111 -.316 -.330 -.337 -.132
(.153) (.203) (.207) (.208) (.212) (.207)
GDP .624*** .857*** .468*** .496*** .492*** .842***
(.067) (.083) (.124) (.134) (.124) (.092)
GDP Per Capita -.189* .036 .150 .141 .143 .008
(.109) (.184) (.190) (.185) (.187) (.180)
Weighted Tariff -.255* -.390** -.026 -.221 -.232 -.387*
(.137) (.196) (.020) (.206) (.203) (.196)
School (Mean Years) .575*** .295 -.146 -.083 -.081 .323
(.175) (.305) (.328) (.331) (.324) (.302)
Remoteness 2.814*** 2.822*** 1.251* 1.466* 1.417* 2.787***
(.459) (.669) (.682) (.798) (.718) (.692)
Distance -1.578*** -1.382*** -.466* -.550** -.534** -1.364***
(.168) (.147) (.236) (.264) (.225) (.155)
Contiguity .347 1.083** 1.030** 1.066** 1.053** 1.080**
(.615) (.454) (.437) (.427) (.430) (.448)
Colony .632* .938*** .544* .605* .578* .937***
(.363) (.311) (.291) (.310) (.296) (.306)
































No. 1578 912 912 912 912
Adj. R-sq. .66 .68 .67 .67 .66
Note 1: robust standard errors (clustered by host country) reported in parenthesis
Note 2: statistical signiﬁcance indicated as * for p<0.1, ** for p<0.05, and *** for p<0.0130 investing across borders: do fdi-specific regulations matter?
Table 2: Regressions: OECD Source Countries Excluded
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Probit Benchmark Heterogeneity Bias I Bias II
FDI Procedures -.049 .326** .312* .334** .300*
(.096) (.156) (.158) (.158) (.156)
FDI Arbitration -.150** .246 .379** .327* .286
(.065) (.196) (.190) (.184) (.192)
FDI Openness -.092 .072 .117 .106 .082
(.116) (.125) (.132) (.126) (.126)
Quality of Institutions .274 -.130 -.233 -.238 -.078
(.171) (.243) (.257) (.256) (.238)
GDP .668*** .939*** .669*** .659*** .974***
(.067) (.082) (.162) (.149) (.088)
GDP Per Capita -.207* .140 .210 .210 .105
(.117) (.186) (.192) (.195) (.182)
Distance -1.832*** -1.945*** -1.283** -1.222*** -2.026***
(.203) (.190) (.503) (.424) (.190)
Remoteness 3.823*** 4.657*** 3.309** 3.153*** 4.702***
(.565) (.723) (1.302) (1.177) (.756)
Weighted Tariff -.296** -.489** -.363 -.368 -.489**
(.150) (.229) (.225) (.225) (.224)
School (Mean Years) .598*** .108 -.164 -.141 .170
(.187) (.327) (.394) (.390) (.332)
Contiguity .217 2.297*** 2.122** 2.143*** 2.323***
(.609) (.775) (.819) (.789) (.787)
Colony .494 1.246*** 1.029*** 1.018*** 1.258***
(.386) (.289) (.339) (.332) (.301)
Language .468** .445 .228 .227 .415
(.234) (.279) (.324) (.313) (.283)


























No. 1220 622 622 622 622
Adj. R-sq. .62 .63 .63 .62
Note 1: robust standard errors, clustered by host country, reported in parenthesis
Note 2: statistical signiﬁcance indicated as * for p<0.1, ** for p<0.05, and *** for p<0.011.6 results 31
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than countries like Afghanistan and Haiti which receive insigniﬁcant amounts of
FDI. Obviously BRIC offers conspicuous advantages like market size to investors
that small, conﬂict-ridden economies do not. That, on paper, the poorer countries
allow 100 percent ownership of equity should foreigners invest does not seem to
matter when most other determinants of FDI are accounted for. This is illustrated
in Figure 7 with outward sectoral FDI data from the United States to 87 IAB coun-
tries.28 There is no systematic relationship between countries’ openness score and
actual FDI received by sector.
In the bias-corrected models of column 3 and 4 in Table 1, the elasticity of FDI
with respect to distance drops dramatically, by two-third, from that in the (biased)
benchmark model in column 2. The positive effect of a shared border increases, but
the coefﬁcient of common colony falls modestly in the bias-corrected models. Co-
efﬁcients on remoteness and GDP are also subdued in the bias-corrected models.
The coefﬁcient of GDP per capita is not statistically signiﬁcant in any of the regres-
sions. Coefﬁcients on the average education level of the adult population and the
mean level of weighted tariff on manufactured import in host countries are also
not statistically different from zero. I detail the estimation procedure and results
in the rest of this section.
In Table 2, FDI-receiving OECD countries in the sample are dropped so that
the FDI relationship is now between the 24 OECD source countries and 65 non-
OECD host countries. Coefﬁcients on FDI Arbitration and FDI Procedures are both
statistically signiﬁcant although the magnitudes are lower than in the fuller sample
(Table 1). The elasticity of distance in the biased regression is much higher than
in the main regression, which drops by about one-third when biases are corrected.
This indicates that the inclusion of 15 OECD countries in the sample overestimated
the effect of FDI-speciﬁc provisions and underestimated the hurdle posed by bilat-
eral distance. When the proportion of developing countries in the sample grows,
28 The 5 sectors are mining, manufacturing, banking, insurance and telecommunications. Concordance
between the sectors deﬁned by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis and IAB is not exact. FDI stock
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the elasticity of distance increases, indicating that among less developed countries,
traditional barriers remain important.
Column 1 of Tables 1 and 2 show probit estimates of the marginal effects
of variables that affect the probability that two countries would have an FDI re-
lationship. OECD countries are more likely to invest in countries whose market
size is big, are closer in terms of bilateral distance, and with which they share a
colonial and linguistic heritage. They are less likely to go to a country with high
trade protection. Curiously, the propensity to invest in countries with good FDI-
speciﬁc institutions is low after controlling for the quality of institutions and other
country-speciﬁc characteristics. The coefﬁcients on the implicit start-up cost for
foreign businesses (measured by the number of legal procedures) and openness to
FDI are not signiﬁcant.
Importantly, in the probit model (column 1 in Tables 1 and 2), the coefﬁcient
of BIT is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level indicating a strong propensity for OECD
countries to invest in host countries that assure protection against expropriation
and provide other guarantees for foreign investors. Column 2 reports OLS esti-
mates of an augmented gravity-type model with the same variables used in the
probit regression, but without any correction for biases. The coefﬁcient on the BIT
variable is not signiﬁcant, suggesting that it does not affect the volume of FDI af-
ter the decision to locate in a country has been made. In other words, it affects
the propensity to invest (driven by ﬁxed cost) but not the volume of investment
(driven by variable cost). The BIT variable is, therefore, a valid exclusion restriction
that is vital for identiﬁcation in models aimed at correcting truncation biases.
The coefﬁcient of FDI Procedures in the (biased) benchmark regression of col-
umn 2 is highly signiﬁcant. As in the probit estimates, coefﬁcients for GDP, tariff,
distance, colonial history and contiguity are of the same sign and similar mag-
nitude. One major difference between the probit and the biased OLS coefﬁcients
is that the coefﬁcient for the quality of institutions is not signiﬁcant. Remoteness34 investing across borders: do fdi-specific regulations matter?
appears to be highly signiﬁcant and positive, indicating that the relatively dis-
tant countries in the sample like the Solomon Islands, Chile, Argentina, Brazil,
and Southern African countries are attractive destinations for FDI. This could be
because these countries attract resource-based FDI (which is location-speciﬁc), or
because remote country pairs invest much more in each other than an equi-distant
pair elsewhere that is less remote.
As mentioned earlier, a major problem with log-linearized OLS regression
(column 2) is that the sample only includes countries that have an active FDI re-
lationship, and drops all country pairs between which the FDI ﬂow on average
between 2007 and 2008 is zero. Over 42 percent of the remaining sample drops
out in this manner, which represents not only a mammoth loss of information,
as shown in Figure 8, but also points to a potential cause of selection bias. After
this, the dependent variable is not really bilateral FDI, but bilateral investment
contingent on a relationship existing. A crucial variable left out of the model is the
probability of being included in the sample, that is, having a non-zero FDI ﬂow. If
countries with active FDI relationships are not randomly selected from the popula-
tion, and the probability of selection is correlated with independent variables like
distance, then the gravity coefﬁcients are no longer reliable.
1.6.1 Country Selection Bias
Column 5 in Table 1 reports results after correcting for selection bias using the stan-
dard Heckman procedure. In the ﬁrst stage, the probit estimates in column 1 give
the probability of an FDI relationship existing conditional on the same explana-
tory variables used to estimate the benchmark equation. An inverse Mills ratio is
computed from the conditional probabilities and then included as a regressor in
the second stage, which excludes the identifying variable (BIT). The magnitudes
of a number of coefﬁcients change modestly between the (biased) benchmark re-
gression and the selection corrected model, but the overall sign and signiﬁcance1.6 results 35
Figure 8: Reported and Unreported FDI Data
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are retained. The inverse Mills ratio is also not statistically signiﬁcant, indicating
that the bias arising from country selection is not a serious problem in the case of
bilateral FDI. This means that even if countries with zero FDI ﬂows excluded from
the country sample in the benchmark regression are now included, the benchmark
elasticities of the impact of barriers would not change much.
This result, however, does not undermine the case for the correction of poten-
tial selection bias. Indeed, the common practice in the extant gravity literature of
making an ad hoc correction to zero ﬂows by recoding zeros as unity, and then
including the logged value of unity (zero) in the sample is ﬂawed. This is seen
in Table 3. The ﬁrst column reports estimates when the zeros are simply dropped.
Columns 2-4 correct for sample selection following three similar approaches: col-
umn 2 estimates the full model with maximum likelihood; column 3 reports results
from the Heckman two-step model (with probit selection equation estimated with
maximum likelihood, and the outcome equation by OLS); column 4 repeats the
procedure of column 3 manually. The coefﬁcients are identical, but this approach
yields more conservative standard errors.29 All three approaches conﬁrm that the
coefﬁcients of the biased benchmark model do not alter much in the version with
correction for sample selection. (The coefﬁcient on the FDI Arbitration variable is,
however, signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level in two of the three models that correct
the sample selection bias).
Now, compare the selection corrected estimates of columns 2-4 with those
from an ad hoc adjustment in column 5. Coefﬁcients on the FDI-related policy
variables, the quality of government and schooling are completely different. Coef-
ﬁcients on the gravity variables, however, are similar in magnitude. Although the
29 The two-step approach is more popular and is the one used by Helpman et al. (2008). Verbeek (2004)
argues that a full maximum likelihood estimation of the sample selection model is more efﬁcient than
the two-step procedure. Further, the OLS regression provides incorrect standard errors because the
remaining residual is heteroskedastic and the inverse Mills ratios (lambdas) are not directly observed
but estimated from the ﬁrst stage regression. The two-step method will also not work if the lambdas
do not vary much across observations. Verbeek argues that the full maximum likelihood estimation
(MLE) offers an integrated approach to estimating the parameters. However, MLE requires a stronger
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R-squared is much higher in the ad hoc regression, the results show that the co-
efﬁcients vary and inferences would be very different depending on whether the
model ignores the zeros (as in column 1), corrects for them (as in columns 2-4), or
makes an atheoretical ad hoc adjustment (column 5).
Finally, Silva & Tenreyro (2006) point out that the presence of heteroskedas-
ticity in trade data actually requires the use of non log-linearized models. Their
method allows the inclusion of zero ﬂows in the sample by estimating the gravity
model with original (non-log) FDI as the dependent variable. The results from their
Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) method in column 6 do not show co-
efﬁcients on the FDI-related policy variables to be statistically signiﬁcant, but some
variables have surprising coefﬁcients. The elasticity of distance, for example, drops
by about two-third as in the main bias-corrected model. An issue with the method
proposed by Silva & Tenreyro (2006) in the context of FDI ﬂows is that it does not
seek to explain zeros as anything special. In my model, zeros are intimately linked
to heterogeneous productivity of ﬁrms. A zero bilateral ﬂow indicates that ﬁrms
are not ﬁnding it proﬁtable to invest abroad because, for a given level of foreign
demand, either the ﬁrm productivity is low, or the ﬁxed and variable costs induced
by distance and policy are prohibitive.
Addressing the zero observation problem (regardless of whether the selection
bias is serious or not) still does not give us consistent estimates when ﬁrms are
heterogeneous. In earlier trade models that follow Krugman (1979), ﬁrms are sym-
metric and all ﬁrms export. Only their volume is constrained by trade costs, not
the decision of ﬁrms of whether to export. When trade barriers are inﬁnite, foreign
varieties are still consumed, but zero quantity of each. The effect of trade costs is
only on the intensive margin of trade. Helpman et al. (2008) show that the cor-
rection of selection bias is inadequate when the assumption of symmetric ﬁrms is
rejected and ﬁrms are not affected by FDI barriers in an identical manner.38 investing across borders: do fdi-specific regulations matter?
When ﬁrms are heterogeneous, an additional bias needs to be controlled for.
As FDI barriers go down, multinational ﬁrms face lower variable costs of investing
abroad, so they increase their FDI. At the same time, ﬁrms that were not productive
enough earlier to incur ﬁxed costs are now in a position to do so, and contribute
to increased FDI. Both the intensive and extensive margins of adjustment must be
acknowledged to obtain an accurate picture of how barriers to FDI affect inﬂow.
Ignoring the extensive margin misattributes the importance of speciﬁc barriers in
restricting total investment ﬂow because they conﬂate the impact of FDI barriers on
these two separate margins of FDI, and render the coefﬁcients inconsistent (Behar
& Nelson 2009). This issue is addressed next, and is illustrated in Figure 6.
1.6.2 Firm Selection Bias
I follow the two-step methodology proposed by Helpman et al. (2008) to control
for unobserved ﬁrm heterogeneity in a cross-country data set, as explained in the
section on estimation strategy. Column 3 in Table 1 reports results from an NLS
model that has controls for ﬁrm selection [ln(eˆ zij -1)] and country selection (b ij).
The coefﬁcient of ˆ wij() is highly signiﬁcant at the one percent level indicating
that there is a severe truncation bias.30 The coefﬁcient of the inverse Mills ratio,
however, is insigniﬁcant. Column 4 in Table 1 is exactly the same model as in col-
umn 3, except that it is now estimated non-parametrically by OLS after dropping
the Pareto assumption and the non-linearity of the unobserved heterogeneity term,
which is estimated by a polynomial in ˆ zij (denoted in the results tables by Z1 and
Z2).
In the bias-corrected estimates of columns 3 and 4, the coefﬁcients of FDI
Arbitration and FDI Procedures are highly signiﬁcant even after controlling for
the general quality of institutions. Compared to the biased benchmark regression
30 In the parametric estimation, I assume delta to be 0.6.1.6 results 39
(column 2), the elasticity of distance drops dramatically from approximately -1.5
to -0.5. The coefﬁcient of FDI Openness is not signiﬁcant.
In columns 5 and 6, I decompose the country and ﬁrm heterogeneity biases
to assess which of the two biases is more prominent. Column 5 reports results
controlling only for heterogeneity bias and not the selection bias. In column 6, only
the sample selection bias is corrected. It is evident that the coefﬁcients in column
5 are close to those in columns 3 and 4, whereas coefﬁcients in column 6 are close
to that obtained in the benchmark regression (column 2). This indicates that an
overwhelming share of the bias has arisen because of unobserved heterogeneity.
While the dominating presence of zero bilateral ﬂows between numerous country
pairs potentially posed serious selection bias, I ﬁnd that in actual estimation, it is
the failure to control for unobserved heterogeneity that produces most of the bias
in a gravity-like model of FDI.
1.6.3 Endogeneity Bias
A pertinent concern in the relationship between FDI regulations and FDI inﬂow is
that regulations could be endogenous to inﬂow. Improved regulation can be a re-
sponse by governments to low levels of FDI, or large foreign investors can exercise
their inﬂuence to lobby governments for regulatory reform after choosing to locate.
Reverse causation of this nature would imply that errors are not independently and
identically distributed leading to inconsistent estimates. Generally, while openness
to FDI could be increased by “stroke-of-the-pen” reforms, improvement in institu-
tional practices and provisions are attained only over the long run. In this paper,
it is the more institutions-oriented de facto indicators of FDI Procedures and FDI
Arbitration that are associated with high levels of FDI, not statutory openness. Fur-
ther, case studies on FDI policy reforms suggest that major FDI inﬂows typically
follow, not precede, reforms.40 investing across borders: do fdi-specific regulations matter?
I formally test for the exogeneity of FDI regulations with three alternative in-
strumental variables related to land. The ﬁrst index on Access to Land Information
measures aspects of whether the land registry or cadastre have a publicly accessi-
ble inventory of private and public land. The second index on the Availability of
Land Information scores the richness of 18 pieces of land-related information (for
example, plot size, land value, address, previous contracts). And the third index
captures the time taken (number of days) to lease public or private land in the
host country on average (World Bank Group 2010). These instrumental variables
are chosen because they are associated with the soundness of domestic institutions;
but they are not a determinant of FDI in their own right because a substantial share
of aggregate global FDI is in services for which access to industrial land is not as
important as for FDI in manufacturing.
The tests follow a three-stage process. First, I conduct the Durbin-Wu-Hausman
(DWH) test for the endogeneity of each of the Openness, Arbitration, and Proce-
dures variables. After conﬁrming a high degree of correlation between the poten-
tially endogenous variable and its instrument, Openness is instrumented by the
Access to Land Information index, FDI Arbitration is instrumented by the Avail-
ability of Land Information index, and FDI Procedures is instrumented by the time
it takes to lease private land. I also instrument for all the three variables together.
In all the four cases, the p-value of the DWH test is greater than 0.15, which fails to
reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of regressors.
Second, I check for the validity of the instruments in an over-identiﬁed model.
None of the p-values of the Hansen’s J chi-squared is less than 0.44; the null hy-
pothesis that the overidentifying restriction is valid is not rejected. Finally, the
results reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments for the Openness and Arbi-
tration variables, but not the Procedures variable. However, when the Arbitration
and Procedures variables are instrumented together in a just-identiﬁed model, the1.7 robustness 41
F-statistic exceeds the critical value in the Stock-Yogo test, rejecting the null hy-
pothesis of weak instruments.31
1.7 robustness
Three robustness checks are performed on the main bias-corrected OLS estimates
reported in column 4 of Table 1. First, is the high statistical signiﬁcance of co-
efﬁcients on FDI Procedures and FDI Arbitration robust to more disaggregated
controls for the quality of institutions in lieu of a single composite index? Tables
4 through 8 replicate the main result by proxying the general quality of institu-
tions by ﬁve separate WGI variables. These ﬁve indicators are highly correlated
with each other (Table 18). To avoid multi-collinearity, each is run in a separate
regression.
The results for all variables concur with the main results. The coefﬁcients for
four of the ﬁve institutional variables – control of graft, regulatory quality, gov-
ernment effectiveness, and political stability – are not statistically signiﬁcant after
FDI-speciﬁc regulations are included in the bias-corrected regressions. The only
coefﬁcient attached to an institutional variable that is not statistically insigniﬁcant
is the rule of law. It is negatively signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level (column 3, Table
5). This is perhaps a result of a high degree of correlation between the rule of law
and the average income level of the country. When the log of GDP per capita is
not included in the regression, the coefﬁcient on the rule of law index is no longer
signiﬁcant. In all results, FDI Arbitration and FDI Procedure coefﬁcients retain
their high level of signiﬁcance at either the 5 or 10 percent levels. The elasticity
of distance drops as dramatically as in the main result, although coefﬁcients on
other gravity variables – colonialism, contiguity and language – are affected only
slightly.
31 These methods follow Cameron & Trivedi (2009) in checking for regressor endogeneity, overidentify-
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In all models, the BIT coefﬁcient is highly signiﬁcant in the selection equation
(column 1) and not in the benchmark outcome equation (columns 2), reafﬁrming
its appropriateness as a candidate for exclusion restriction. It passes the prima
facie test of a valid exclusion restriction by being shown to affect the propensity to
invest, but not the volume of investment. This point is worth emphasizing because
as appealing as the technique for controlling truncation bias is, its efﬁcacy can
be stymied by the lack of a convincing exclusion restriction. The main exclusion
restriction in Helpman et al. (2008) is religion, which Anderson (2011) does not
ﬁnd convincing. Baranga (2009), too, ﬁnds problems with the way Helpman et al.
(2008) have used the religion variable. Using an alternative but similar index yields
a highly signiﬁcant coefﬁcient in the benchmark OLS regression, weakening the
case for the variable’s validity as an exclusion restriction.
Second, how do coefﬁcients change when a dummy for natural resource-rich
countries is added to test whether poor countries rich in oil, gas and minerals
attract FDI in the extractive industries? To restrict the sample to just developing
countries, I drop the FDI-receiving OECD countries. Host countries are assigned a
dummy value of one if during 2002 and 2006 their average share of fuel, ores, and
metal exports in total exports exceeded 20 percent.32 In Table 9, the coefﬁcient of
the resource dummy is not statistically different from zero indicating that resource-
rich developing countries are not likely to attract more FDI after controlling for
FDI regulations, the quality of institutions, and other host country characteristics.
The statistical signiﬁcance of coefﬁcients of the FDI Procedures and Arbitrations
variables is retained.
Third, do the main results stand when alternative time periods, namely the
individual years of 2006, 2007, and 2008, are considered? I do not consider years
prior to 2006 because the explanatory indicators of FDI regulation cover prevailing
regimes during or before 2006. Table 10 reports results obtained by estimating the
model using data for 2006. GDP, GDP per capita, and tariffs averaged over the
32 Fuel products are SITC Section 3; metals and ores are SITC Divisions 27, 28, and 68.1.8 conclusion 43
preceding 5 years, from 2001 to 2005. The basic results not only stand, but the
coefﬁcient of FDI Arbitration increases substantially when the dependent variable
uses FDI stock for the year 2006. A 10 percent increase in a country’s combined
score in the Ease of Process and the Judicial Assistance indices increases FDI by
over 5.6 percent.
Table 11 reports results obtained by estimating the model using data for 2007.
Here, both the coefﬁcients of FDI Arbitration and FDI Procedures fall to the extent
that the FDI Arbitration coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant only at the 10.6 percent
level.33 It is conjectured that host country regulations and characteristics matter
less when there is a global glut in investment funds. Recall that the year 2007
recorded the highest levels of outward FDI ever in the world. Total FDI stock was
valued at nearly US$18 trillion and FDI ﬂows nearly reached the US$2 trillion mark
for the ﬁrst time.
Table 12 reports results obtained by estimating the model using data for 2008.
The estimates are comparable to the main results, except for the coefﬁcient of the
quality of institutions. As in Table 5 when it was measured by the rule of law
indicator, the coefﬁcient is negative and signiﬁcant, that is, an improved measure
of the rule of law is associated with lower FDI. As stated earlier, this coefﬁcient
becomes insigniﬁcant when GDP per capita is dropped from the regression.
1.8 conclusion
Gravity models have long been a workhorse for explaining trade, investment, and
migration ﬂows between countries. They ﬁt the data well, but until recently, they
were seen as atheoretical (Anderson & Van Wincoop 2003). This paper uses a new
empirical methodology to estimate the impact of FDI-speciﬁc institutions on FDI
inﬂow in a theoretically derived gravity-like model.
33 It is signiﬁcant at the 3 percent level if standard errors are clustered by source country, but I opt for
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The traditional estimates obtained from log-linearized models of barriers to
FDI are not consistent because they do not account for all the information con-
tained in bilateral data, especially between countries that invest zero amounts in
each other (country selection problem). These models also do not acknowledge
that ﬁrms are heterogeneous and only a fraction of them are in a position to invest
abroad (ﬁrm selection problem). The amount of FDI between countries i and j is
not just a function of low barriers to FDI, but also the fraction of ﬁrms that invest in
country j from country i. Not controlling for the latter assigns exaggerated elastic-
ities to policy costs and gravity variables by conﬂating the extensive and intensive
margins of investment ﬂow.
I ﬁnd that FDI-speciﬁc regulations matter signiﬁcantly for attracting FDI. Us-
ing a new, painstakingly prepared data set on FDI regulations across 87 countries, I
show that de facto implementation of laws related to the arbitration of commercial
disputes and the number of procedures required to set up wholly-owned foreign
subsidiaries are strongly associated with high levels of FDI stock. These provisions
proxy for the quality of FDI-speciﬁc institutions in the country, and affect FDI more
directly than measures of the general quality of institutions.
I also show that it is how the targeted laws and regulation are translated into
practice that is important rather than what is written in statutes. This is reﬂected
by the fact that (the coefﬁcient on) openness to FDI, measured by the average
percentage of equity permitted to be owned by foreign investors, is not a signiﬁ-
cant determinant of FDI. Further, the correction of biases dramatically reduces the
salience of bilateral distance – a proxy for transaction costs and information asym-
metry – as a barrier to inward foreign direct investment from OECD countries.APPENDIX
1.a deriving the gravity equation for fdi with heterogeneous firms
Consumption: A representative consumer prefers variety (v) and maximizes an iso-
elastic utility function U = [
R
x(v)dv]1= subject to aggregate expenditure, E =
[
R
p(v)x(v) . Aggregate expenditures equal aggregate income (Y). The elasticity
of substitution across products,  = 1=1-, is the same across countries. When
goods 1 to n are continuous, E takes the form
R

 p(v)x(v) where 
 is the “mass”
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Multiplying both sides of (1.7) by p(v1) and taking integral with respect to v1, we
get:
E = x(v2)p(v2) R
p(v1)1-dv1







The Marshallian demand for a variety (v) is:










Production: A country i ﬁrm produces one unit of output with a cost-minimizing
combination of inputs (cia) where a measures the number of bundles of inputs
used per unit of output; ci is the cost of the bundle, which is uniform across
country i. A ﬁrm’s productivity is therefore given by 1
a. Monopolistic competition
with increasing returns implies decreasing average cost as quantity produced in-
creases [l(x) = f+cx]. Each ﬁrm produces one distinct variety. Each country i has
a continuum of ﬁrms measured by Ni. Relative size of two countries can therefore
be estimated by
Ni
Nj. There is no strategic interaction among ﬁrms, and they only
charge a constant mark-up over the marginal cost to maximize proﬁt as follows:
i = pixi -ciaxi -cifi (1.9)
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Investing across borders: Firms serving the foreign market through exports face
higher variable costs (e
ij > f
ij) and ﬁrms undertaking FDI face higher ﬁxed costs
(ff
ij > fe
ij). Production through subsidiary in country j by parent ﬁrms in country1.A deriving the gravity equation for fdi with heterogeneous firms 47
i reduces transport costs, but there exist non-trivial coordination and transaction




 , which differs from price in
country i by including bilateral trade costs. For FDI, or more precisely sales by







Note that factor cost is ci for exporters and cj for investors. Take Ej = Yj.
Substituting (1.11) in (1.9), and using (1.8), we get:










Productivity threshold: sale by multinational ﬁrms from i are proﬁtable in j
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The cumulative distribution function of the productivity index a is assumed
to be a truncated Pareto distribution with support [aL, aH]. Only ﬁrms with pro-






k where k is the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution such
that k >  -1. Total sales generated by foreign-owned subsidiaries from i to j are
Raij
aL pjxjNidG(a) where G(aij) is multiplied by Ni.
Substituting for pj and xj, and characterizing FDI ﬂows Fij =
Raij
aL a1-dG(a)








Aggregate FDI sales abroad is the measure of ﬁrms Ni multiplied by the aver-
age value of FDI of a representative ﬁrm. Note that Nij = NiG(aij). Yj is the eco-



































The ﬁrst multiplicative term is common across all countries; the second term








(1.14), we can estimate FDI as in (1.16). 'i captures all variables with subscript
i as a ﬁxed effect for the FDI source country. 'j amalgamates country j speciﬁc
variables: GDP (lnYj), factor and policy costs (lncj), and inward multi-lateral re-
sistance (lnPj); wij captures the ij component of Fij.1.A deriving the gravity equation for fdi with heterogeneous firms 49
fdiij = 0 +'i +'j+˛dij +wij +eij (1.16)
Sample selection: equation 1.16 is observed only for positive values of FDI, that
is, FDIij = 1 if zij > 0 where zij is the latent (unobserved) variable that deter-
mines whether country pairs enter into an FDI relationship or not. This latent
variable can be estimated by probit conditional on characteristics contained in the
outcome equation 1.16. For identiﬁcation, we need at least one variable that affects
only the propensity of investing but not the actual amount of investment. In other
words, this term (ij) affects ﬁxed cost, but not the variable cost. Equation 1.17
speciﬁes the determinants of the latent variable affecting FDI participation. Equa-
tion 1.18 calculates the ﬁtted values of the latent variable (ˆ zij) through predicted
probabilities of ﬁrms from country i proﬁtably investing in country j, where  is
the standard normal distribution.
zij = 0 +j +i +dij +ij +ij (1.17)
Pr(FDIij = 1jzij > 0) = (0 +j +i +dij +ij) (1.18)
Note that the error terms of the selection equation 1.17 and the outcome equa-
tion 1.16 are correlated because the unobserved factors that determine FDI partic-
ipation also affect the magnitude of FDI. These two error terms are jointly nor-
mally distributed. This leads to a sample selection bias because in equation 1.16,
E[eijjFDIij = 1] 6= 0. Under the assumptions of the model, there exists a consistent
estimator of E[eijjFDIij = 1] which is
e
2 b ij, where b ij is the inverse Mills ratio
obtained from equation 1.18.50 investing across borders: do fdi-specific regulations matter?
Unobserved heterogeneity bias: the latent variable zij is related to the productiv-
ity of the marginal FDI-undertaking ﬁrm. If this ﬁrm does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to
undertake FDI, then no ﬁrm from country i will. From equation 1.12, the ratio of














where Zij = exp(zij).
From equation 1.15, Wij = (Zij) -1 where  = k-+1
-1
Zij is unobserved, but E[zij] can be estimated by ˆ zij from equation 1.18.
The insight of Helpman et al. (2008) is to show that both the sample selection
and productivity heterogeneity biases can be redressed in a two-step estimation
procedure beginning with the same probit selection equation. However, to prevent
the model from being under-identiﬁed, this method requires at least one other vari-
able that enters the probit equation but not the FDI outcome equation to remove
the collinearity problem between ˆ zij and investment barriers. Without the extra
identifying variable, ˆ zij is merely a linear combination of the same explanatory
variables used in both the selection and outcome equations.
We know that E[zijjFDIij = 1] = E[zij]+E[ijjFDIij = 1].
So, expected value of the latent variable given that the bilateral FDI ﬂow is
positive can be estimated by ˆ zij = ˆ zij +b ij, the sum of the ﬁtted value of the latent
variable and the inverse Mills ratio.
In equation 1.16, the control for ﬁrm selection bias (wij) is ln{exp[(ˆ zij)]-1}
and the control for sample selection bias is b ij. This is a parametric non-linear
regression. When the Pareto assumption is relaxed, Helpman et al. (2008) show1.B firm productivity, exports, and horizontal fdi 51
that equation 1.16 can be estimated non-parametrically in an ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression where sample selection is controlled by the inverse Mills ratio
(b ij) and ﬁrm selection is controlled by a polynomial of ˆ zij.
Finally, to sum up the estimation procedure on a practical note, how do I
obtain ˆ zij and b ij? A probit model predicts probabilities of positive FDI from a
regression that includes the standard gravity variables, host country FDI barriers
and dummies for source countries. This includes the identifying variable – BIT –
which is excluded in the second stage. From the predicted probabilities, an inverse
Mills ratio (b ij) is computed. Because the inverse Mills ratio would be undeﬁned
for predicted probabilities of 1, all probabilities > 0.9999999 are converted to equal
0.9999999. Next, the ﬁtted values of the latent variable ˆ zij = -1(ˆ pij) are obtained
from the normalized predicted probabilities. This is added to the inverse Mills
ratio to obtain ˆ zij = ˆ zij +b ij.
1.b firm productivity, exports, and horizontal fdi
The model is from Helpman et al. (2004) and Helpman (2006) where ﬁrms vary
by productivity which is discovered after entering the industry. Factor cost (c)
is country-speciﬁc and productivity (inverse of a) is ﬁrm-speciﬁc. Fixed cost of
serving the domestic market is cfD and the ﬁrm charges a marked-up price to
maximize proﬁt as follows:
D() = (v)-1B-cfD, where B = A(1-)(c
)1-
If a ﬁrm sells in a foreign country with the same demand elasticity () but
different demand function, and faces transport and transaction cost as well as ﬁxed
export cost, cfX, it makes additional proﬁt from exports as follows:52 investing across borders: do fdi-specific regulations matter?
X() = 1-Bj -cfX where =(v)-1
Firms with productivity D <  < 
j
X produce for the domestic market.
Those with productivity  > 
j
X export. A ﬁrm that undertakes horizontal FDI
builds a second plant in country j incurring ﬁxed cost cfI and variable cost cja to
reap proﬁt as follows:
I() = Bj -cfI
For the case in which demand level is the same in two countries, Bj = B, cj =






This leads to a natural sorting of ﬁrms by productivity. If the liberalization of
trade or investment reduces marginal costs, not only can ﬁrms trade or invest more,
but new ﬁrms can participate in foreign trade or investment as the productivity
cut-off required to do so falls. In Figure 9, the proﬁt schedules I andX swivel
backwards. As an example, Baldwin et al. (2003) found that 4.5 percent reduction
in Canada-US tariffs increased ﬁrms’ propensity to export by 63 percent.1.B firm productivity, exports, and horizontal fdi 53
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1.c additional tables
Table 3: Addressing the Zero Problem
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Zero Dropped MLE 2 Step 2 Step Ad-hoc Poisson
Auto Manual
FDI Procedures .458** .453*** .457*** .457** .156 .026
(.197) (.125) (.125) (.203) (.103) (.182)
FDI Arbitration .260 .305* .300* .300 -.187 .226
(.206) (.177) (.177) (.206) (.140) (.594)
FDI Openness .054 .060 .061 .061 .069 .338
(.128) (.110) (.110) (.126) (.092) (.244)
Quality of Institutions -.111 -.127 -.132 -.132 .377** .284
(.203) (.153) (.153) (.207) (.144) (.233)
GDP .857*** .851*** .842*** .842*** .820*** .738***
(.083) (.052) (.055) (.092) (.070) (.075)
GDP Per Capita .036 .003 .008 .008 -.096 .027
(.184) (.116) (.117) (.180) (.125) (.214)
Weighted Tariff -.390** -.389*** -.387*** -.387* -.398*** -.191
(.196) (.133) (.133) (.196) (.149) (.286)
School (Mean Years) .295 .336 .323 .323 .300** -.112
(.305) (.224) (.225) (.302) (.124) (.499)
Remoteness 2.822*** 2.812*** 2.787*** 2.787*** 2.845*** .468
(.669) (.395) (.397) (.692) (.444) (.587)
Distance -1.382*** -1.380*** -1.364*** -1.364*** -1.395*** -.513***
(.147) (.122) (.126) (.155) (.107) (.083)
Contiguity 1.083** 1.074*** 1.080*** 1.080** .937** -.208
(.454) (.347) (.347) (.448) (.449) (.230)
Colony .938*** .943*** .937*** .937*** 1.070*** .442**
(.311) (.290) (.291) (.306) (.316) (.222)
Language .889*** .840*** .836*** .836*** .858*** .900***
(.260) (.237) (.237) (.265) (.231) (.226)
Bilateral Investment Treaty .267 .117 .135
(.179) (.124) (.143)
Inverse Mills Ratio -.179 -.179
(.239) (.378)
No. 912 1578 1578 912 1578 1578
Adj. R-sq. .66 .66 .76
Note 1: robust standard errors, clustered by host country, reported in parenthesis
Note 2: statistical signiﬁcance indicated as * for p<0.1, ** for p<0.05, and *** for p<0.011.C additional tables 59
Table 4: General Quality of Institutions (Graft)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Probit Benchmark Heterogeneity Bias I Bias II
FDI Procedures -.061 .456** .494** .509** .460**
(.088) (.197) (.201) (.199) (.203)
FDI Arbitration -.126** .247 .368* .321 .284
(.062) (.205) (.197) (.194) (.205)
FDI Openness -.112 .058 .126 .120 .065
(.102) (.125) (.127) (.121) (.123)
Control of Graft .292** -.073 -.209 -.216 -.100
(.141) (.187) (.188) (.191) (.188)
GDP .627*** .857*** .504*** .493*** .839***
(.068) (.082) (.136) (.124) (.092)
GDP Per Capita -.176 .026 .110 .113 .005
(.120) (.196) (.197) (.199) (.194)
Weighted Tariff -.299** -.378* -.185 -.192 -.375*
(.140) (.191) (.205) (.202) (.192)
School (Mean Years) .595*** .291 -.079 -.083 .305
(.188) (.306) (.333) (.327) (.303)
Remoteness 2.842*** 2.823*** 1.475* 1.397* 2.786***
(.464) (.677) (.823) (.735) (.700)
Distance -1.572*** -1.381*** -.574** -.542** -1.358***
(.168) (.147) (.268) (.225) (.156)
Contiguity .352 1.080** 1.059** 1.040** 1.077**
(.611) (.457) (.427) (.431) (.450)
Colony .652* .936*** .600* .563* .933***
(.366) (.311) (.314) (.298) (.306)
Language .615*** .887*** .509* .514* .836***
(.229) (.260) (.279) (.277) (.266)


























No. 1578 912 912 912 912
Adj. R-sq. .66 .67 .66 .66
Note 1: robust standard errors, clustered by host country, reported in parenthesis
Note 2: statistical signiﬁcance indicated as * for p<0.1, ** for p<0.05, and *** for p<0.0160 investing across borders: do fdi-specific regulations matter?
Table 5: General Quality of Institutions (Rule of Law)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Probit Benchmark Heterogeneity Bias I Bias II
FDI Procedures -.048 .476** .511** .526*** .477**
(.092) (.190) (.196) (.193) (.196)
FDI Arbitration -.136** .278 .409* .363* .314
(.065) (.213) (.206) (.203) (.213)
FDI Openness -.097 .046 .109 .100 .051
(.112) (.132) (.134) (.128) (.130)
Rule of Law .277** -.199 -.348** -.353** -.217
(.122) (.166) (.169) (.171) (.170)
GDP .617*** .863*** .511*** .505*** .846***
(.067) (.085) (.133) (.124) (.094)
GDP Per Capita -.139 .080 .155 .156 .052
(.100) (.171) (.170) (.171) (.166)
Weighted Tariff -.293** -.399** -.212 -.221 -.395**
(.132) (.191) (.202) (.199) (.191)
School (Mean Years) .541*** .264 -.088 -.087 .287
(.176) (.301) (.325) (.319) (.298)
Remoteness 2.886*** 2.818*** 1.443* 1.384* 2.775***
(.459) (.666) (.803) (.720) (.690)
Distance -1.576*** -1.382*** -.564** -.543** -1.360***
(.168) (.146) (.265) (.225) (.156)
Contiguity .342 1.072** 1.056** 1.040** 1.070**
(.610) (.457) (.430) (.433) (.450)
Colony .646* .951*** .616** .587** .947***
(.365) (.308) (.307) (.293) (.303)
Language .606*** .914*** .536* .548* .863***
(.226) (.263) (.278) (.277) (.269)


























No. 1578 912 912 912 912
Adj. R-sq. .66 .67 .67 .66
Note 1: robust standard errors, clustered by host country, reported in parenthesis
Note 2: statistical signiﬁcance indicated as * for p<0.1, ** for p<0.05, and *** for p<0.011.C additional tables 61
Table 6: General Quality of Institutions (Regulatory Quality)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Probit Benchmark Heterogeneity Bias I Bias II
FDI Procedures -.033 .437** .463** .479** .435**
(.092) (.206) (.211) (.208) (.213)
FDI Arbitration -.163** .222 .376* .328* .262
(.073) (.207) (.198) (.196) (.206)
FDI Openness -.130 .053 .136 .127 .061
(.113) (.125) (.126) (.120) (.123)
Regulatory Quality .323** .032 -.150 -.164 .014
(.154) (.249) (.244) (.250) (.252)
GDP .618*** .857*** .505*** .494*** .841***
(.067) (.082) (.139) (.125) (.091)
GDP Per Capita -.136 -.029 .046 .050 -.060
(.102) (.192) (.191) (.193) (.189)
Weighted Tariff -.230 -.355 -.205 -.215 -.353
(.149) (.213) (.225) (.221) (.213)
School (Mean Years) .546*** .334 -.025 -.026 .363
(.174) (.311) (.338) (.330) (.308)
Remoteness 2.876*** 2.783*** 1.418* 1.337* 2.745***
(.467) (.678) (.842) (.738) (.701)
Distance -1.592*** -1.381*** -.553** -.520** -1.361***
(.164) (.147) (.278) (.227) (.155)
Contiguity .281 1.085** 1.103** 1.084** 1.083**
(.610) (.452) (.429) (.433) (.445)
Colony .641* .926*** .596* .560* .924***
(.362) (.312) (.314) (.298) (.306)
Language .627*** .867*** .482* .491* .814***
(.226) (.251) (.273) (.269) (.257)


























No. 1578 912 912 912 912
Adj. R-sq. .66 .67 .66 .66
Note 1: robust standard errors, clustered by host country, reported in parenthesis
Note 2: statistical signiﬁcance indicated as * for p<0.1, ** for p<0.05, and *** for p<0.0162 investing across borders: do fdi-specific regulations matter?
Table 7: General Quality of Institutions (Government Effectiveness)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Probit Benchmark Heterogeneity Bias I Bias II
FDI Procedures -.048 .456** .492** .506** .455**
(.091) (.197) (.202) (.200) (.204)
FDI Arbitration -.150** .266 .410** .362* .306
(.067) (.202) (.192) (.191) (.202)
FDI Openness -.107 .052 .121 .112 .058
(.108) (.130) (.131) (.125) (.128)
Govt. Effectiveness .352** -.119 -.316 -.322 -.139
(.153) (.224) (.222) (.227) (.226)
GDP .599*** .863*** .518*** .512*** .849***
(.068) (.086) (.137) (.126) (.095)
GDP Per Capita -.153 .037 .120 .122 .008
(.104) (.188) (.187) (.190) (.184)
Weighted Tariff -.252* -.395** -.228 -.238 -.392*
(.147) (.197) (.208) (.205) (.197)
School (Mean Years) .552*** .291 -.071 -.071 .318
(.174) (.303) (.329) (.322) (.300)
Remoteness 2.859*** 2.829*** 1.445* 1.392* 2.793***
(.469) (.681) (.829) (.742) (.705)
Distance -1.582*** -1.381*** -.548** -.529** -1.362***
(.167) (.146) (.271) (.229) (.156)
Contiguity .317 1.085** 1.079** 1.066** 1.082**
(.611) (.453) (.427) (.431) (.447)
Colony .638* .941*** .601* .573* .940***
(.367) (.314) (.317) (.300) (.309)
Language .602*** .888*** .510* .522* .836***
(.222) (.258) (.274) (.273) (.264)


























No. 1578 912 912 912 912
Adj. R-sq. .66 .67 .67 .66
Note 1: robust standard errors, clustered by host country, reported in parenthesis
Note 2: statistical signiﬁcance indicated as * for p<0.1, ** for p<0.05, and *** for p<0.011.C additional tables 63
Table 8: General Quality of Institutions (Political Stability)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Probit Benchmark Heterogeneity Bias I Bias II
FDI Procedures -.048 .443** .482** .498** .441**
(.081) (.197) (.203) (.200) (.204)
FDI Arbitration -.132** .236 .373* .332 .268
(.059) (.208) (.204) (.202) (.209)
FDI Openness -.119 .054 .136 .126 .061
(.118) (.127) (.129) (.123) (.125)
Political Stability .247** -.019 -.184 -.193 -.016
(.109) (.161) (.174) (.167) (.161)
GDP .644*** .855*** .462*** .448*** .836***
(.074) (.086) (.146) (.132) (.097)
GDP Per Capita -.146 -.008 .088 .090 -.047
(.101) (.172) (.173) (.173) (.162)
Weighted Tariff -.300** -.369* -.173 -.176 -.359*
(.131) (.190) (.200) (.198) (.190)
Schooling (Mean Years) .532*** .327 -.050 -.048 .355
(.185) (.309) (.336) (.329) (.306)
Remoteness 2.804*** 2.796*** 1.385* 1.280* 2.743***
(.444) (.648) (.798) (.713) (.677)
Distance -1.540*** -1.382*** -.528* -.488** -1.356***
(.169) (.145) (.269) (.227) (.156)
Contiguity .396 1.086** 1.038** 1.010** 1.086**
(.630) (.453) (.421) (.430) (.447)
Colony .685* .929*** .559* .515* .923***
(.364) (.307) (.305) (.292) (.303)
Language .694*** .872*** .419 .423 .813***
(.222) (.257) (.284) (.280) (.263)


























No. 1578 912 912 912 912
Adj. R-sq. .66 .67 .67 .66
Note 1: robust standard errors, clustered by host country, reported in parenthesis
Note 2: statistical signiﬁcance indicated as * for p<0.1, ** for p<0.05, and *** for p<0.0164 investing across borders: do fdi-specific regulations matter?
Table 9: Dummy for Resource Rich Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Probit Benchmark Heterogeneity Bias I Bias II
FDI Procedures -.032 .356** .334** .356** .329**
(.092) (.149) (.149) (.152) (.151)
FDI Arbitration -.153** .240 .376** .321* .281
(.065) (.195) (.187) (.183) (.190)
FDI Openness -.086 .082 .126 .112 .093
(.119) (.130) (.136) (.130) (.131)
Quality of Institutions .224 -.173 -.255 -.257 -.118
(.178) (.211) (.218) (.216) (.202)
GDP .669*** .941*** .673*** .663*** .978***
(.068) (.081) (.162) (.149) (.088)
GDP Per Capita -.185 .159 .221 .219 .123
(.121) (.184) (.187) (.190) (.178)
Distance -1.835*** -1.937*** -1.282** -1.222*** -2.024***
(.203) (.190) (.496) (.418) (.187)
Remoteness 3.886*** 4.692*** 3.335** 3.177** 4.745***
(.602) (.722) (1.328) (1.198) (.762)
Weighted Tariff (Manu) -.291* -.479** -.355 -.360 -.479**
(.151) (.233) (.228) (.228) (.227)
School (Mean Years) .591*** .106 -.162 -.137 .170
(.197) (.331) (.396) (.392) (.335)
Resource Dummy -.086 -.086 -.053 -.046 -.084
(.192) (.226) (.235) (.231) (.223)
Contiguity .221 2.305*** 2.127** 2.149*** 2.332***
(.613) (.774) (.818) (.789) (.787)


























No. 1220 622 622 622 622
Adj. R-sq. .62 .63 .62 .62
Note 1: robust standard errors, clustered by host country, reported in parenthesis
Note 2: statistical signiﬁcance indicated as * for p<0.1, ** for p<0.05, and *** for p<0.011.C additional tables 65
Table 10: Regressions: FDI Stock in 2006
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Probit Benchmark Heterogeneity Bias I Bias II
FDI Procedures -.130* .370** .415*** .437*** .341**
(.076) (.155) (.154) (.151) (.157)
FDI Arbitration -.160* .491*** .565*** .535*** .513***
(.096) (.152) (.130) (.139) (.133)
FDI Openness -.056 .007 .054 .032 .010
(.088) (.112) (.116) (.109) (.115)
Quality of Institutions .437*** -.080 -.254 -.242 -.049
(.164) (.214) (.204) (.209) (.212)
GDP (2001-05) .756*** .868*** .498*** .575*** .917***
(.080) (.080) (.162) (.134) (.086)
GDP Per Capita (2001-05) -.340*** .062 .228 .203 .020
(.103) (.169) (.174) (.173) (.166)
Weighted Tariff (2001-05) -.286* -.221 -.073 -.113 -.231
(.161) (.198) (.208) (.205) (.201)
School (Mean Years) .537*** .492* .191 .235 .578**
(.206) (.247) (.256) (.255) (.250)
Remoteness 2.006*** 2.621*** 1.784** 1.974*** 2.708***
(.465) (.655) (.691) (.639) (.674)
Distance -1.289*** -1.272*** -.675*** -.807*** -1.344***
(.161) (.136) (.214) (.179) (.146)
Contiguity .815 1.116** .918** .962** 1.127**
(.570) (.469) (.433) (.434) (.475)
Colony .793* .783** .408 .488 .825**
(.432) (.332) (.361) (.339) (.333)
Language .782*** .630** .206 .316 .649**
(.176) (.264) (.285) (.286) (.269)


























No. 1561 881 881 881 881
Adj. R-sq. .67 .68 .68 .68
Note 1: robust standard errors, clustered by host country, reported in parenthesis
Note 2: statistical signiﬁcance indicated as * for p<0.1, ** for p<0.05, and *** for p<0.0166 investing across borders: do fdi-specific regulations matter?
Table 11: Regressions: FDI Stock in 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Probit Benchmark Heterogeneity Bias I Bias II
FDI Procedures -.110 .333* .380** .393** .333*
(.106) (.187) (.183) (.182) (.191)
FDI Arbitration -.169*** .249 .314 .288 .268
(.062) (.206) (.192) (.197) (.201)
FDI Openness -.080 .054 .098 .084 .055
(.124) (.123) (.126) (.120) (.122)
Quality of Institutions .449*** -.022 -.173 -.179 -.034
(.158) (.196) (.195) (.199) (.199)
GDP .704*** .836*** .563*** .568*** .830***
(.070) (.078) (.144) (.128) (.086)
GDP Per Capita -.306*** .028 .164 .162 .018
(.107) (.179) (.188) (.187) (.176)
Weighted Tariff (Manu) -.353** -.359** -.208 -.221 -.357**
(.146) (.170) (.185) (.176) (.169)
School (Mean Years) .477** .293 .037 .047 .310
(.198) (.285) (.304) (.295) (.279)
Remoteness 2.543*** 2.635*** 1.818** 1.828** 2.628***
(.475) (.673) (.802) (.730) (.682)
Distance -1.530*** -1.367*** -.818*** -.832*** -1.362***
(.177) (.142) (.264) (.227) (.151)
Contiguity .885 1.069** .953** .938** 1.058**
(.614) (.431) (.384) (.394) (.421)
Colony .494 .926*** .740** .732** .929***
(.423) (.321) (.324) (.312) (.318)
Language .908*** .740*** .379 .409 .717**
(.232) (.279) (.302) (.301) (.284)
Bilateral Investment Treaty .520*** .105
(.139) (.179)








No. 1636 939 939 939 939
Adj. R-sq. .66 .67 .67 .66
Note 1: robust standard errors, clustered by host country, reported in parenthesis
Note 2: statistical signiﬁcance indicated as * for p<0.1, ** for p<0.05, and *** for p<0.011.C additional tables 67
Table 12: Regressions: FDI Stock in 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Probit Benchmark Heterogeneity Bias I Bias II
FDI Procedures -.051 .423** .455** .477** .415**
(.087) (.188) (.192) (.191) (.192)
FDI Arbitration -.178*** .260 .435** .372** .301
(.061) (.194) (.178) (.181) (.187)
FDI Openness -.114 -.007 .075 .057 -.000
(.086) (.109) (.112) (.106) (.108)
Quality of Institutions .389** -.155 -.381** -.387** -.160
(.156) (.187) (.190) (.194) (.188)
GDP .629*** .847*** .463*** .464*** .856***
(.065) (.086) (.133) (.123) (.094)
GDP Per Capita -.215* .054 .185 .187 .024
(.110) (.180) (.180) (.184) (.175)
Weighted Tariff (Manu) -.219 -.279 -.115 -.137 -.282
(.144) (.189) (.196) (.195) (.189)
School (Mean Years) .630*** .518* .100 .089 .567*
(.185) (.299) (.333) (.318) (.298)
Remoteness 2.884*** 2.736*** 1.268* 1.233* 2.769***
(.442) (.635) (.741) (.648) (.667)
Distance -1.569*** -1.340*** -.462* -.465** -1.365***
(.168) (.147) (.235) (.198) (.155)
Contiguity .568 1.041** .874** .869** 1.031**
(.619) (.442) (.409) (.416) (.442)
Colony .751** .686** .284 .252 .695**
(.377) (.306) (.307) (.297) (.307)
Language .626*** .769*** .345 .385 .735***
(.224) (.251) (.271) (.269) (.257)
Bilateral Investment Treaty .312** .194
(.145) (.177)








No. 1532 853 853 853 853
Adj. R-sq. .66 .67 .67 .66
Note 1: robust standard errors, clustered by host country, reported in parenthesis
Note 2: statistical signiﬁcance indicated as * for p<0.1, ** for p<0.05, and *** for p<0.0168 investing across borders: do fdi-specific regulations matter?
Table 13: Description and Source of Variables
Variables Description Source
Stock of FDI Log of absolute FDI stock (in US$ million) between two
countries. (The main regression results average FDI stock
from 2007 to 2008: robustness results use values for
individual years 2006, 2007, 2008)
OECD
FDI Arbitration Log of index (0 to 100) created by averaging two separate
IAB indices: (i) the Ease of Arbitration Process and (ii) the
Extent of Judicial Assistance. The former assesses whether
there are obstacles that the disputing parties face in
seeking a resolution to their dispute; and the latter
measures the interaction between domestic courts and
arbitral tribunals, including the courts’ willingness to assist
during the arbitration process and their effectiveness in
enforcing arbitration awards.
IAB
FDI Procedures Log of index (0 to 100) derived by normalizing the number
of pre- and post-incorporation procedural steps required to
set up a wholly foreign-owned subsidiary.
IAB
FDI Openness Log of index (0 to 100) of average percentage of foreign
equity ownership permitted across 2 primary sectors
(mining and oil and gas; agriculture and forestry), 1 light
manufacturing sector, and 8 services sectors (from banking




Weighted sum of ﬁve indicators of the World Governance
Indicators (WGI). Weights derived from principle
components. (1) Control of Graft measures the extent to
which public power is exercised for private gain, as well as
capture of the state by elites and private interests. (2) Rule
of Law measures the extent to which agents have
conﬁdence in and abide by the rules of society, in particular
the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. (3)
Government Effectiveness measures the quality of public
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of
its independence from political pressures, the quality of
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility
of the government’s commitment to such policies. (4)
Regulatory Quality measures the ability of the government
to formulate and implement sound policies and
regulations that permit and promote private sector
development. (5) Political Stability captures perceptions of
the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means,






GDP Gross domestic product in current US dollar. WDI1.C additional tables 69
GDP per capita Gross domestic product per capita in current US dollar. WDI
Weighted Tariff Weighted mean applied tariff is the average of effectively
applied rates weighted by the product import shares
corresponding to each partner country. When the
effectively applied rate is unavailable, the most favored
nation rate is used. Manufactured products are
commodities classiﬁed in SITC revision 3 sections 5-8
excluding division 68.
WDI
School Log of average number of years of education received by
people aged 25 and older in the lifetime based on
education attainment levels of the population converted
into years of schooling based on theoretical durations of
each level of education.
Barro and
Lee (2010)
Remoteness Log of the sum of a country’s bilateral distance with all
other countries in the world, weighted by the share of the
GDP of the partner country in total world GDP.
Computed
by author
Distance Distance in kilometers between two countries using the
great circle formula which uses latitudes and longitudes of
each country’s most populated cities or ofﬁcial capital.
CEPII
Contiguity 1 for pairs of countries that share a border; 0 otherwise CEPII
Colony 1 for pairs of countries ever in a colonial relationship; 0
otherwise
CEPII
Language (ethnic) 1 if a language is spoken by at least 9 percent of the




1 for pairs of countries that have a bilateral investment





Log of index (from 0 to 100) that measures aspects of
whether the land registry or cadastre have publicly
accessible inventory of private and public land; if the
inventory is online; if the cadastre shares data about land;
and whether there is a publicly accessible land information





Log of index (0 to 100) which scores countries on 18 pieces
of land-related information (for example, plot size, land
value, address, previous contracts, existing land claims, tax
classiﬁcation, information on surroundings).
IAB70 investing across borders: do fdi-specific regulations matter?
Table 14: Summary Statistics of Variables
Obs. Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum
FDI Stock (US$ million),
2007-08
1835 3691.18 21210.30 0 437939
Log of FDI Stock, 2007-08 1111 5.39 3.17 -5.99 12.99
FDI Openness (Log) 83 4.27 0.66 0 4.62
FDI Arbitration (Log) 84 4.08 0.68 0 4.53
FDI Procedures (Log) 84 3.95 0.63 0 4.62
Quality of Institutions,
averaged 2002-06
84 -0.23 0.82 -1.74 1.76
Bilateral Investment Treaty 1835 0 1
Log of GDP, averaged
2002-06
84 24.42 2.11 19.77 30.11
Log of GDP per capita,
averaged 2002-06
84 7.59 1.48 4.99 10.68
Schooling (Log of Mean
Years), 2005
84 1.81 0.56 0.10 2.57




81 1.88 0.69 0.00 3.10
Log of Remoteness 84 8.95 0.25 8.55 9.42
Log of Distance 1835 8.55 0.90 4.09 9.88
Contiguity 1835 0 1
Colony 1835 0 1
Common Ethnic Language 1835 0 1
Access to Land
Information (Log)
83 3.86 0.58 0 4.56
Availability of Land
Information (Log)
83 4.13 0.76 0 4.621.C additional tables 71











IAB Countries* 6773.3 810.6 45200 5.77
World 12500 1855.3 58800 6.62
Share 54.2% 43.7% 77.9% 87.1%
Source: FDI ﬁgures compiled from UNCTAD and OECD sources; GDP and population from WDI
Note 1: *include 84 out of 87 IAB countries (excluding Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro)72 investing across borders: do fdi-specific regulations matter?
Table 16: Lists of Countries
FDI Source Countries (OECD sample)*
1. Australia 2. Austria** 3. Belgium 4. Canada** 5. Czech Republic** 6. Denmark
7. Finland 8. France** 9. Germany 10. Greece** 11. Hungary 12. Ireland** 13.
Iceland 14. Italy 15. Japan** 16. Korea, Rep.** 17. Luxembourg 18. Mexico** 19.
The Netherlands 20. Norway 21. New Zealand 22. Poland** 23. Portugal 24.
Slovak Republic** 25. Spain** 26. Sweden 27. Switzerland 28. Turkey** 29. United
Kingdom** 30. United States**
*Excludes Chile, which became OECD member only in 2010.
**Also in the IAB sample of FDI recipients
FDI Host Countries (IAB sample)
1. Afghanistan 2. Albania 3. Angola 4. Argentina 5. Armenia 6. Austria 7. Azer-
baijan 8. Bangladesh 9. Belarus 10. Bolivia 11. Bosnia and Herzegovina 12. Brazil
13. Bulgaria 14. Burkina Faso 15. Cambodia 16. Cameroon 17. Canada 18. Chile 19.
China 20. Colombia 21. Costa Rica 22. Côte d’Ivoire 23. Croatia 24. Czech Republic
25. Ecuador 26. Egypt, Arab Rep. 27. Ethiopia 28. France 29. Georgia 30. Ghana 31.
Greece 32. Guatemala 33. Haiti 34. Honduras 35. India 36. Indonesia 37. Ireland 38.
Japan 39. Kazakhstan 40. Kenya 41. Korea, Rep. 42. Kosovo 43. Kyrgyz Republic 44.
Liberia 45. Macedonia, FYR 46. Madagascar 47. Malaysia 48. Mali 49. Mauritius 50.
Mexico 51. Moldova 52. Montenegro 53. Morocco 54. Mozambique 55. Nicaragua
56. Nigeria 57. Pakistan 58. Papua New Guinea 59. Peru 60. Philippines 61. Poland
62. Romania 63. Russian Federation 64. Rwanda 65. Saudi Arabia 66. Senegal 67.
Serbia 68. Sierra Leone 69. Singapore 70. Slovak Republic 71. Solomon Islands
72. South Africa 73. Spain 74. Sri Lanka 75. Sudan 76. Tanzania 77. Thailand 78.
Tunisia 79. Turkey 80. Uganda 81. Ukraine 82. United Kingdom 83. United States
84. Venezuela, R.B. 85. Vietnam 86. Yemen, Rep. 87. Zambia.Table 17: Correlation Among Explanatory Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
(1) FDI Arbitration 1.000
(2) FDI Procedures -0.002 1.000
(3) FDI Openness -0.020 0.064 1.000
(4) Quality of Institutions 0.339 0.182 0.109 1.000
(5) GDP 0.351 -0.077 -0.165 0.580 1.000
(6) GDP per capita 0.281 0.123 0.103 0.824 0.720 1.000
(7) Weighted tariff -0.196 -0.191 -0.140 -0.658 -0.342 -0.670 1.000
(8) Schooling 0.268 0.052 0.192 0.500 0.423 0.677 -0.558 1.000
(9) Remoteness -0.225 -0.276 -0.177 -0.226 -0.120 -0.327 0.342 -0.304 1.000
(10) Distance -0.163 -0.163 -0.082 -0.110 -0.066 -0.156 0.187 -0.156 0.620 1.000
(11) Contiguity 0.061 0.060 0.047 0.146 0.093 0.156 -0.143 0.137 -0.203 -0.238 1.000
(12) Colony 0.026 0.001 0.038 0.073 0.056 0.060 -0.017 0.018 -0.017 -0.052 0.163 1.000
(13) Language 0.076 -0.038 0.044 0.095 0.073 0.038 0.000 0.021 0.071 0.128 0.088 0.360 1.000
(14) Bilateral Investment Treaty 0.156 -0.032 -0.038 -0.016 0.109 0.034 -0.009 0.150 -0.092 -0.228 0.046 0.087 -0.071 1.00074 investing across borders: do fdi-specific regulations matter?
Table 18: Correlation Among WGI Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1) Control of Graft 1
(2) Rule of Law 0.944 1
(3) Regulatory Quality 0.891 0.908 1
(4) Government Effectiveness 0.948 0.943 0.948 1
(5) Political Stability 0.763 0.835 0.720 0.752 11.C additional tables 75
Table 19: Construction of the FDI Openness Variable
FDI Openness: This measures the average equity ownership permitted for foreign in-
vestors in greenﬁeld investment as well as mergers and acquisitions across 11 sectors,
which are themselves averaged equity limits for foreign ownership in 33 sub-sectors listed
below. As an example, the Philippines allows 100 percent of foreign ownership in insur-
ance and tourism, but imposes tight restriction in other sectors. In mining, and oil and
gas industries maximum foreign equity permitted by the Philippine Constitution is 40
percent unless the investor enters into a 25 year agreement with a minimum investment
of $50,000,000. The Constitution also limits foreign capital participation in public utilities
(telecommunications and transportation) to a maximum of 40 percent. The media indus-
tries (newspaper publishing and television broadcasting) and publishing sector are closed
to foreign owners. This gives the Philippines an openness score of 60.06 out of 100. On
the other hand, countries that allow 100 percent of foreign equity ownership in all sectors
score the maximum of 100. This includes some of the world’s least developed countries
like Afghanistan, Haiti, Côte d’Ivoire, Rwanda, Senegal and Zambia.
Broad industries Further disaggregation
I. Resource sector (1) Mining; (2) Oil and gas
II. Primary sector (3) Agriculture; (4) Forestry
III. Light manufacturing (5) Light manufacturing; (6) Food products; (7)
Pharmaceuticals; (8) Publishing
IV. Telecommunication (9) Fixed line infrastructure; (10) Fixed line telephony
services; (11) Wireless/mobile infrastructure; (12)
Wireless/mobile services
V. Electricity (13) Electric power generation from coal; (14) Electric power
generation from solar; (15) Electric power generation from
biogas; (16) Electric power generation from hydro; (17)
Electric power generation from wind (18) Electric power
transmission; (19) Electric power distribution
VI. Banking (20) Banking
VII. Insurance (21) Insurance
VIII. Transportation (22) Railway freight; (23) Domestic air services; (24)
International air services; (25) Port operations; (26) Airport
operations
IX. Media (27) Television broadcasting; (28) Newspapers
X. Construction,
tourism and retail
(29) Construction; (30) Tourism; (31) Retail distribution
services
XI. Health care and
waste management
(32) Health care services; (33) Waste management and
recycling
Source: World Bank Group (2010)76 investing across borders: do fdi-specific regulations matter?
Table 20: Construction of the FDI Arbitration Variable
FDI Arbitration: This is measured by the average of two indices related to commercial
arbitration. The ﬁrst one is the Ease of Process index, scored from 1 to 100, comparing how
easy it is for investors and other parties to design arbitration proceedings in their chosen
manner and conduct fair and predictable arbitration. The second is the Ease of Judicial
Assistance index, scored from 1 to 100, comparing the extent of judicial assistance to the




(1) Role of the courts in assisting and facilitating arbitration;
(2) Role of the courts in conﬁrming, enforcing and setting
aside arbitration awards; (3) Time taken to enforce a
hypothetical arbitration award.
Ease of Process (1) Freedom to choose arbitrators’ nationality, gender,
qualiﬁcations, language, seat of arbitration, use of foreign
counsel; (2) Tribunal integrity, that is, impartiality and
conﬁdentiality; (3) Choice of arbitration methods and
institutions; (4) Time taken between ﬁling of request for
arbitration to the constitution of a tribunal.
Source: World Bank Group (2010)
For example, Saudi Arabia has one of the lowest scores (29.5 out of 100) on measures re-
lated to arbitration because its laws are not detailed and they impose several restrictions.
According to World Bank Group (2010), the arbitrator must be a Saudi national or a Mus-
lim foreigner; in practice, following the Hanbali school of thought arbitrators must be male.
The list of arbitrators is determined by the government, hearings must be public, and be
conducted in Arabic. Arbitral proceedings must be conducted in accordance with Islamic
law and any applicable regulations. There are no legal provisions for court assistance with
interim measures and evidence taking during arbitration proceedings. Both domestic and
foreign awards are enforced by the Board of Grievances, Commercial Section, which can
take up to 56 weeks.
At the other extreme, France is one of the leading forums for international arbitration
(scoring 90.3 out of 100). It recognizes international arbitration as involving the interests of
international trade. International arbitration does not need to be in writing. French courts
strongly support arbitration, upholding an arbitrator’s jurisdiction wherever possible. On
average, it takes around 5 weeks to enforce an arbitration award rendered in France or in a
foreign country, from ﬁling an application to a writ of execution attaching assets (assuming
there is no appeal).1.C additional tables 77
Table 21: Construction of the FDI Procedures Variable
FDI Procedures: This measures the number of pre- and post-incorporation procedural
steps formally required to establish a wholly foreign-owned, domestically incorporated
company. A procedure is deﬁned as any interaction of the parent company or its legal
representatives with external parties (for example, government agencies or notaries). The
initial number of procedures that apply to locally-owned SMEs are taken from the Doing
Business series of reports (www.doingbusiness.org). Additional procedures required for
foreign companies are then added, such as the requirement to submit authenticated legal
documentation of the parent company, obtain a trade license, or acquire an investment
approval. In countries where there is no difference between the requirements for domestic
and foreign companies, the list of procedures is identical to that of Doing Business (World
Bank Group 2010).
Issues
What is counted as a
separate procedure
(1) Procedures that must be completed in the same building, but
in different ofﬁces; (2) If the same ofﬁce has to be visited several
times for different sequential procedures, each is counted
separately; (3) Each electronic procedure is counted separately;
(4) If two procedures can be completed through the same
website but require separate ﬁlings, they are counted as two
procedures; (5) Procedures required for ofﬁcial correspondence
or transactions with public agencies (for example, if a company
seal or stamp is required on ofﬁcial documents, such as tax
declarations, obtaining the seal or stamp is counted); (6) If a
company must open a bank account before registering for sales
tax or value added tax, this transaction is counted as a
procedure.
What is not counted as
a procedure
(1) Procedures that the company undergoes to connect to
electricity, water, gas, and waste disposal services; (2)
Interactions between company founders or company ofﬁcers
and employees; (3) Industry-speciﬁc procedures are excluded
(for example, environmental regulations are included only when
they apply to all businesses); (4) procedures that are not legal,
unavailable to the general public, or not used by the majority of
companies.
Source: World Bank Group (2010)
For example, Canada scores the highest among the 87 countries (100 out of 100) in re-
quiring the least number of legal procedures (2) and time (6 days) for foreign investors
to set up a business. According to World Bank Group (2010), foreign companies can ﬁle
for federal incorporation or provincial registration via Industry Canada’s online Electronic
Filing Centre. They require no additional procedure other than the post-incorporation no-
tiﬁcation within 30 days. At the other end, Venezuela scores 10.5 because it requires 19
separate procedures and 169 days, on average, for a foreign business to be set up. The
19 procedures range from authenticating documents at the country of origin to obtaining
work permit for foreign workers.Table 22: Composite Country Scores of Selected FDI Regulation
Investing Across
Sectors
Arbitrating Commercial Disputes Starting a Foreign
Business














AFG Afghanistan 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 89.47
ALB Albania 95.42 40.70 68.50 54.6 73.68
AGO Angola 72.20 57.30 59.90 58.6 47.37
ARG Argentina 91.78 72.20 55.10 63.65 15.79
ARM Armenia 89.10 82.30 27.30 54.8 68.42
AUT Austria 93.18 83.70 83.00 83.35 57.89
AZE Azerbaijan 87.77 53.60 37.00 45.3 73.68
BGD Bangladesh 100.00 67.50 55.30 61.4 63.16
BLR Belarus 81.66 79.00 84.90 81.95 78.95
BOL Bolivia 85.16 65.70 54.20 59.95 15.79
BIH Bosnia and
Herzegovina
92.91 57.10 76.30 66.7 36.84
BRA Brazil 86.18 45.70 57.20 51.45 21.05
BGR Bulgaria 98.15 64.70 68.60 66.65 84.21
BFA Burkina Faso 99.50 67.60 67.90 67.75 84.21
KHM Cambodia 95.95 48.60 46.00 47.3 57.89
CMR Cameroon 87.67 79.60 64.60 72.1 36.84





















CHL Chile 100.00 62.80 74.80 68.8 52.63
CHN China 64.93 76.10 60.20 68.15 15.79
COL Colombia 97.27 52.30 18.20 35.25 42.11
CRI Costa Rica 94.09 59.00 50.90 54.95 36.84
HRV Croatia 97.22 71.40 52.70 62.05 63.16
CZE Czech Republic 98.15 88.50 65.80 77.15 52.63
CIV Côte d’Ivoire 100.00 82.90 55.80 69.35 47.37
ECU Ecuador 93.61 58.30 59.80 59.05 26.32
EGY Egypt, Arab Rep. 87.18 74.90 54.20 64.55 73.68
ETH Ethiopia 50.00 74.00 34.80 54.4 57.89
FRA France 87.24 86.60 94.00 90.3 73.68
GEO Georgia 100.00 75.20 53.60 64.4 89.47
GHA Ghana 99.09 88.50 40.90 64.7 57.89
GRC Greece 86.31 86.10 48.60 67.35 15.79
GTM Guatemala 100.00 72.30 58.40 65.35 47.37
HTI Haiti 93.55 74.90 28.50 51.7 42.11
HND Honduras 99.07 73.30 59.50 66.4 31.58
IND India 74.98 67.60 53.40 60.5 26.32
IDN Indonesia 71.89 81.80 41.30 61.55 47.37
IRL Ireland 98.15 79.60 75.80 77.7 84.21
JPN Japan 84.83 77.70 65.90 71.8 57.89
KAZ Kazakhstan 88.09 70.40 78.20 74.3 63.16
KEN Kenya 89.96 77.10 56.30 66.7 47.37
KOR Korea, Rep. 86.68 81.90 70.20 76.05 52.63
KOS Kosovo 99.09 63.90 27.50 45.7 52.63

























































LBR Liberia 97.14 56.40 42.00 49.2 68.42
MKD Macedonia, FYR 98.15 74.90 69.70 72.3 78.95
MDG Madagascar 97.17 74.20 83.30 78.75 94.74
MYS Malaysia 67.50 81.80 66.70 74.25 52.63
MLI Mali 94.91 67.50 8.30 37.9 68.42
MUS Mauritius 96.36 71.20 77.10 74.15 63.16
MEX Mexico 63.76 84.70 52.70 68.7 52.63
MDA Moldova 97.68 81.80 60.90 71.35 63.16
MNE Montenegro 100.00 60.00 46.50 53.25 36.84
MAR Morocco 84.87 69.50 64.70 67.1 68.42
MOZ Mozambique 90.45 80.90 22.20 51.55 47.37
NIC Nicaragua 96.75 73.30 40.30 56.8 68.42
NGA Nigeria 97.27 82.30 71.50 76.9 47.37
PAK Pakistan 83.33 68.50 35.50 52 52.63
PNG Papua New Guinea n/a 55.60 26.20 40.9 57.89
PER Peru 99.07 83.30 62.60 72.95 52.63
PHL Philippines 60.06 87.00 33.70 60.35 21.05
POL Poland 93.97 82.80 77.30 80.05 73.68
ROM Romania 98.15 75.20 93.20 84.2 73.68
RUS Russian Federation 91.24 76.10 76.60 76.35 57.89
RWA Rwanda 100.00 80.10 73.30 76.7 94.74
SAU Saudi Arabia 58.79 30.40 28.60 29.5 78.95
SEN Senegal 100.00 85.10 98.80 91.95 84.21
SRB Serbia 97.68 71.40 90.20 80.8 68.42
SLE Sierra Leone 100.00 70.50 20.50 45.5 68.42





















SVK Slovak Republic 98.15 85.70 88.50 87.1 68.42
SLB Solomon Islands 100.00 0.00 0.00 0 57.89
ZAF South Africa 91.27 79.00 94.50 86.75 68.42
ESP Spain 89.96 76.10 75.30 75.7 42.11
LKA Sri Lanka 85.14 71.30 38.00 54.65 78.95
SDN Sudan 67.00 73.30 67.80 70.55 42.11
TZA Tanzania 86.86 74.70 39.10 56.9 36.84
THA Thailand 52.07 81.80 40.80 61.3 63.16
TUN Tunisia 97.40 71.40 52.30 61.85 36.84
TUR Turkey 91.86 69.50 68.60 69.05 68.42
UGA Uganda 98.70 62.90 39.30 51.1 0.00
UKR Ukraine 88.83 78.10 72.60 75.35 52.63
GBR United Kingdom 94.96 87.50 94.50 91 73.68
USA United States 95.23 81.80 75.30 78.55 68.42
VEN Venezuela, R.B. 81.84 57.10 52.20 54.65 10.53
VNM Vietnam 68.75 61.80 57.20 59.5 47.37
YEM Yemen, Rep. 89.19 81.40 44.00 62.7 63.16
ZMB Zambia 100.00 65.70 77.30 71.5 63.16